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 Preface 
 
The English word 'faith' derives from the Latin word 'fides' meaning trust and confidence 
(Collins English Dictionary, 5th ed., Glasgow, 2000). The Latin word fides comes from the 
name of the Roman goddess Fides, the deification of: good faith and honesty, the oath, and 
that 'one must keep one's word'. Fides was honoured with a temple built near Capitol Hill in 
254 BC where sacrificial offerings were presented in recognition of the secret, inviolable trust 
between gods and mortals (The New Encyclopædia Britannica, Vol. 
4, p. 762, 15th ed. 1990). Fides can be found on the 
backside of antique Roman coins in many 
variations. The civil variations show the 
goddess Fides holding ears of grain 
and a fruit basket. As a symbol of the 
reliance of Roman emperors on the 
Roman army, Fides was also shown with 
standards and other military insignia (Fides 
Exercituum or Fides Mili- tum). In the later Roman 
period the goddess was called Fides Publica. She was 
considered the guardian of treaties and other state documents, 
which were placed for safekeeping in her temple (Schermaier, p. 78). Over a period of time 
the idea of fides, i.e. good faith, was separated from the image of the goddess. Interlocked 
hands were used on Roman coins to symbolise the binding nature of a promise. This shows 
that the focus of bona fides, the Roman notion of good faith, was focused on the principle 
that 'one must keep one's word'. In modern contract law, this idea became independent from 
good faith, and today the parties' faith refers to the reliance that the other party will not act 
against the purpose of the contract. 
 
I would like to thank Prof R H Christie for supervising this dissertation and for teaching me to 
look and learn beyond my own jurisdiction.  
 
I would also like to thank Chenaz Adams who not only helped me with the manuscript but 
who is also what I like best about Cape Town. 
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Introduction 
A. The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 
I. Early Attempts to Unify Sales Law 
The law of the sale of goods, as most other areas of the law, is a predominantly national af-
fair. This was not always the case: between the thirteenth and the eighteenth century, the ius 
commune was applicable throughout Europe and led to mostly uniform rules applicable 
across national borders.1 Moreover, among the travelling merchants in Europe customary 
rules, applied by merchant courts, developed. It is said2 that this lex mercatoria was based 
on the same fundamental rules throughout Europe.3 With the nationalisation and codification 
of the civil law during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the uniformity created by the lex 
mercatoria ceased to exist.4 
 
Even after the decline of the ius commune and the lex mercatoria it was recognised that in-
ternational trade needs uniform rules. In 1926 the International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law (UNIDROIT) was founded on the initiative of the League of Nations.5 The first 
step toward the unification of the law relating to the international sale of goods is attributed to 
the German scholar Ernst Rabel. He presented a first provisional report on the possibilities 
for unifying sales law to UNIDROIT.6 
 
II. The 1964 Hague Conventions: ULIS and ULF 
The efforts of UNIDROIT, interrupted by the Second World War, led eventually to the Hague 
Conference of 1964, which adopted two conventions: the Convention for the Uniform Law of 
International Sales (ULIS), and the Convention for the Uniform Law on the Formation of Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF), also referred to as the '1964 Hague Conven-
                                                
1 See for good faith under the ius commune in detail Chapter 1, A, II below. 
2 See critically with regard to the universality and consistency of the lex mercatoria Eiselen, 116 SALJ 323 at 
333 with further references in Fn. 52. 
3 Schlechtriem/Schlechtriem, Commentary, Introduction, sec. III. See for good faith under the old lex mercatoria 
in detail Chapter 1, A, III, below. 
4 Cf. in detail e.g. Felemegas, p. 137 ff. But cf. Schlechtriem/Schlechtriem, Commentary, Introduction, sec. III 
who insists that the lex mercatoria did not cease to exists but only fell into oblivion. The practical effects are, 
however, the same. 
5 Haase/Grimm/Versfeld, p. 1. 
6 Schlechtriem/Schlechtriem, Commentary, Introduction, sec. I; Eiselen, 116 SALJ 323 at 334. 
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tions'.7 With only nine states having ratified the Conventions,8 ULIS and ULF were not con-
sidered a success in the unification of international trade law.9 Despite the lack of their ac-
ceptance in practice, ULIS and ULF are not regarded as a complete failure as they played an 
important role in the process of drafting the CISG.10 Moreover, ULIS and ULF led to a body 
of case law within the adopting states that can, with certain restrictions, serve as a starting 
point in the interpretation of CISG provisions.11 
 
III. UNCITRAL and the CISG 
In 1966 the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)12 was es-
tablished as a Permanent Commitee of the United Nations, which started its work on the uni-
fication of sales law in 1968.13 The UNCITRAL working group attempted to achieve a bal-
ance in the representation of the various regions of the world in order to avoid the lack of 
international acceptance which ULIS and ULF had suffered.14 The UNCITRAL working group 
held nine sessions.15 In 1978 it presented a draft convention on sales law, which built the 
basis for the Vienna Conference of 1980.16 Forty two of the sixty two states that attended the 
Vienna Conference voted in favour of the presented draft of the CISG17 (also called Vienna 
Convention and in the following referred to as 'the Convention').18 The CISG came into force 
on 1 January 1988, one year after the tenth state ratified the convention.19 By the end of the 
                                                
7 The texts of ULIS and ULF are, amongst others, reprinted in English, French and German in 
Mertens/Rehbinder, pp. 25 - 80. 
8 Cf. Schlechtriem/Schlechtriem, Commentary, Introduction, sec. I with a list of the ratifying states in fn. 7. Fe-
lemegas, p. 140 counts only eight adopting states, which might be due to the fact that the United Kingdom 
only ratified with the reservation that the uniform law must be chosen by the contracting parties. 
9 Schlechtriem/Schlechtriem, Commentary, Introduction, sec. I; Felemegas, p. 140; Haase/Grimm/Versfeld, 
p. 1. 
10 Eiselen, 116 SALJ 323 at 336; Schlechtriem/Schlechtriem, Commentary, Introduction, sec. I. 
11 Bridge, sec. 2.08. 
12 Cf. the UNCITRAL homepage www.uncitral.org for an overview over the history and functions of UNCITRAL 
as well as the texts of legal documents, their status of adoption as well as the traveaux préparatoires. Cf. fur-
thermore Schlechtriem/Schlechtriem, Commentary, Introduction, sec. I with an overview of sources in German 
in Fn. 9. 
13 Schlechtriem/Schlechtriem, Commentary, Introduction, sec. I. 
14 As a result Africa received nine seats, Asia seven, Eastern Europe five, Latin America six and the 'Western 
States' nine, cf. Schlechtriem/Schlechtriem, Commentary, Introduction, sec. I. 
15 Cf. for the documentation of the working group sessions, Schlechtriem/Schlechtriem, Commentary, Introduc-
tion, sec. I, Fn. 10. 
16 Schlechtriem/Schlechtriem, Commentary, Introduction, sec. I; Felemegas, p. 142 f.; Haase/Grimm/Versfeld, 
p. 2. 
17 Haase/Grimm/Versfeld, p. 2; Eiselen, 116 SALJ 323 at 337. 
18 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna 1980. 
19 Cf. Eiselen, 116 SALJ 323 at 337. 
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year 2004 the CISG was adopted by sixty four states.20 Almost twenty five years after its 
conclusion and more than fifteen years after its coming into force, the CISG was praised as a 
great success.21 However, it is felt that this success is not always sufficiently reflected in pub-
licity and popularity.22 
 
IV. South Africa and the CISG 
Due to its international isolation during the years of Apartheid, South Africa did not play an 
active role in the creation of the CISG, although it send observers to some events.23 In con-
trast to other UNCITRAL instruments, such as the Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency, 
South Africa has not adopted the CISG. Ten years after South Africa re-entered the interna-
tional community as a welcomed member, no visible steps toward an adoption of the CISG 
have been taken.24 Scholarly writings have, however, strongly recommended the adoption of 
the CISG in order to stimulate international trade in South Africa, and to strengthen the role 
of South Africa as the leading economical force on the continent.25 
 
V. Characteristics of the CISG 
The CISG builds a uniform text of law for international sales of goods. It is a so called 'self-
executing' Convention, which means that it does not have to be brought into force by an act 
of the domestic legislator.26 This form of legislation guarantees the highest degree of uni-
formity, since changes cannot occur in the process of transformation into domestic law, as is 
often the case with other, 'normal' international conventions. The CISG combines the two 
subject matters of ULIS and ULF - the rules for formation of the sales contract and the sub-
stantive provisions - in one legal text. The Convention is divided into four parts: the general 
rules and scope of application (Part I); the formation of the contract (Part II); the substantive 
rules for the sales contract (Part III); and the final public international law provisions (Part IV). 
 
                                                
20 For an up-to-date overview over the status of the CISG see www.uncitral.org. 
21 See as only a few of many e.g.: Schlechtriem/Schlechtriem, Commentary, Introduction, sec. III; Eiselen, 116 
SALJ 323 at 345;  
22 Will, Part II, p. 5. 
23 Eiselen, 116 SALJ 323 at 323 f. 
24 Other that e.g. the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration for which at least a draft for the trans-
formation in South African Law exists. 
25 Eiselen, 116 SALJ 323 at 367 ff.; Haase/Grimm/Versfeld, p. 61 f. 
26 Schlechtriem/Schlechtriem, Commentary, Introduction, sec. II. 
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The CISG is drafted in a style closer to a civil law code than to common law legislation in that 
it contains more abstract terms and generalised rules instead of the detailed provisions and 
explicitly formulated legislation.27 The fact that the CISG contains more indefinite legal con-
cepts and terms is attributed to two factors: a compromise between irreconcilable conflicts of 
interests; and the necessity to obtain a certain degree of flexibility, because a revision of the 
text of the CISG would require the consent of all signature states.28 The character of the 
CISG as an international body of law forbids it to simply import concepts from domestic law, 
or to interpret terms as they are known in domestic law.29 This, together with the fact that 
there is no possibility to appeal to a highest judicial authority in order to obtain a definite in-
terpretation of the CISG, build a challenge in maintaining uniformity in the day to day applica-
tion of the CISG.30 
 
B. The Scope and Methodology of the Dissertation 
I. Good Faith and the CISG: the Problem 
The term 'good faith' appears only once in the CISG - in Art. 7(1) CISG, which reads: 
In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international char-
acter and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of 
good faith in international trade. 
The location of good faith within the provision about the interpretation of the Convention and 
the wording of Art. 7(1) CISG are the result of a difficult compromise the drafters of the CISG 
reached. This compromise was necessary because of the different opinions about the role, 
good faith should assume under the Convention. The divergence was mainly caused by the 
different attitudes domestic legal systems have toward good faith. Although the term 'good 
faith' is known in most jurisdictions, the substantive content of good faith as well as the con-
text of its application vary so widely that it is said that a 'common core' cannot be deduced.31 
 
The compromise reached with Art. 7(1) CISG, poses a great problem because it creates un-
certainty with regard to the scope of application of good faith under the CISG. This disserta-
tion approaches this problem from three angles. Firstly, the controversy surrounding the 
                                                
27 Eiselen, 116 SALJ 333 at 340. 
28 Schlechtriem/Schlechtriem, Commentary, Introduction, sec. II. 
29 Schlechtriem/Schlechtriem, Commentary, Introduction, sec. III. 
30 Schlechtriem/Schlechtriem, Commentary, Introduction, sec. III. 
31 Cf. e.g. Felemegas, p. 192 
5 
meaning of 'good faith' will be examined.32 Secondly, the scholarly debate about good faith in 
the CISG will be analysed.33 Thirdly, the application of good faith under the CISG in judicial 
practice will be discussed.34 
 
II. The Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of the 
historical development of good faith,35 the different approaches toward the concept of good 
faith in contemporary domestic legal systems,36 and the developments with regard to good 
faith on an international level.37 Finally, some general conclusions are drawn from the histori-
cal and domestic understanding of good faith, which are made in anticipation of the analysis 
of good faith within the CISG.38 
 
The second chapter provides a theoretical analysis of good faith under the CISG, consisting 
of a discussion of the legislative provisions and their legislative history and the academic 
controversy following from the wording of Art. 7(1) CISG.39 It will be shown that a deductive 
approach to good faith is even less promising under the CISG than under domestic systems 
of law.40 Hence, the scope of good faith can only be determined by an inductive method, 
which has to consider the other means provided by the CISG in order to fulfil the functions of 
good faith.41 
 
The third chapter discusses the existing case law with regard to good faith under the CISG 
and examines whether or not one can state that certain specific doctrines emerge under a 
general notion of good faith within the CISG.42 
                                                
32 See Chapter 1. 
33 See Chapter 2. 
34 See Chapter 3. 
35 See Chapter 1, sec. A below. 
36 See Chapter 1, sec. B below. 
37 See Chapter 1, sec. C below. 
38 See Chapter 1, sec. D below. 
39 See Chapter 2, section A below. 
40 See Chapter 2, section B below. 
41 See Chapter 2, section C and D below. 
42 See Chapter 3 below. 
6 
Chapter 1: The Development of Good Faith 
In order to understand the concept of good faith as well as the existing controversies sur-
rounding good faith in the CISG, the following chapter briefly summarises the origin and the 
development of good faith in legal history.43 It provides an overview of the different appear-
ances of good faith (or its complete absence) in selected contemporary domestic legal sys-
tems,44 and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.45 It will be 
shown that the ideas of what good faith is and the purpose it ought to serve differ considera-
bly from one jurisdiction to another. Hence, the different functions good faith is required to 
fulfil will be examined as well as some of the existing misconceptions about the substantive 
content of a general principle of good faith.46 
 
A. The Historical Origins 
I. Roman Law 
The principle of good faith as a legal concept first emerged in Roman law as bona fides.47 It 
was developed as a procedural standard clause, known as exceptio doli. Claims had to be 
adjudicated according to strict law (iudicia stricti juris) and the exceptio doli clause provided 
the judge with the necessary discretion in order to reach a just solution. Bona fides allowed 
him to decide the case in accordance of what he deemed fair and reasonable.48  
 
Subsequently, bona fides was extended to a substantive principle within certain types of 
consensual contracts, such as partnerships, sales, land leases, tutelage, and the hire of a 
thing or services.49 A special procedural device was not necessary here as the procedural 
formula already permitted the judge to apply the principle of good faith.50 
 
                                                
43 See section A below. 
44 See section B below. 
45 See section C below. 
46 See section D below. 
47 The exact date is contentious. Cicero is the oldest written source mentioning bona fides. He refers to a case 
decided on the basis of bona fides around 100 BC, cf. Schermaier, p. 68. Estimations reach from third century 
BC to the second half of the second century BC as the time of origin, cf. Schermaier, p . 71 f. with further ref-
erences. 
48 Schermaier, p. 76; Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 16. 
49 Schermaier, p. 70; Klein, 15 Liverpool Law Review 115 at 116. 
50 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 16 f. 
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Bona fides has been described as one of the most fertile agents in the development of Ro-
man law.51 Roman jurists did not develop a definition of good faith. Nevertheless, the use of 
this abstract term did not lead to arbitrariness or uncertainty in the judicial practice. This is 
attributed to the fact that there was a common understanding of bona fides within the Roman 
society, which recognised comprehensive duties of fidelity and faithfulness.52  
 
At the core of the principle of good faith under Roman law was the rule that 'one must keep 
one's word' (pacta sunt servanda).53 This is insofar remarkable as contemporary legal sys-
tems recognise pacta sunt servanda as an autonomous principle that is based on the recog-
nition of contractual freedom and the free will of the parties to contract.54 Hence, pacta sunt 
servanda builds the fundament of modern contract law, whereas the principle of good faith 
mainly serves to mitigate the harsh consequences caused by the strict application of pacta 
sunt servanda.55 This development is also visible in the UNIDROIT Principles56 where pacta 
sunt servanda is contained in Art. 1.3 (Binding character of contract) whereas Art. 1.7 stipu-
lates the principle of good faith. This modern view of pacta sunt servanda is not entirely for-
eign to ancient Roman law. Cicero stated that faithfulness to one's word is a precondition of 
any legal intercourse, whereas good faith does not demand performance itself but influences 
the way performance is ought to be made.57 
 
II. The Medieval ius commune and the lex mercatoria 
Medieval jurists, in applying the ius commune, were confronted with the same problem as 
Roman lawyers - how to avoid results that were caused by the application of strict law and 
that were felt to be unjust? The problem was solved mainly under the broad notion of equity 
(aequitas). The principle of good faith was seen as part of equity.58 With regard to contract 
                                                
51 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 17. 
52 Schermaier, p. 77. 
53 Klein, 15 Liverpool Law Review 115 at 116. 
54 See e.g. Christie, p. 14: 'The principle that the courts will enforce contracts, expressed in Latin as pacta sunt 
servanda is obviously necessary as a general principle'. Furthermore, Veytia, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 1191 at 1201 f. 
There is a deviating opinion in English law that sees pacta sunt servanda as an area of application for a gen-
eral principle of good faith in English law, cf. Klein, 15 Liverpool Law Review 115 at 116; O'Connor, p. 11. It 
should, however, be noted that the prevailing view that denies good faith a role in English law, of course, see 
pacta sunt servanda as the fundamental principle of the law of contracts. 
55 Cf e.g. Veytia, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 1191 at 1206. 
56 UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts, see in detail section C below. 
57 Schermaier, p. 78. 
58 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 17. 
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law, Medieval jurists even identified good faith with equity.59 Under the ius commune, as in 
Roman law, the term good faith was not defined. However, three main substantive features 
of good faith were distinguished: (i) keeping one's word; (ii) neither (a) deliberately deceiving 
the other party nor (b) driving an overly harsh bargain; and (iii) respecting those obligations 
which were not expressly undertaken but belonged to the contract as a matter of fair 
interpretation.60 
 
Simultaneously, merchants developed their own commercial law. This law merchant or lex 
mercatoria consisted of customary rules which were uniformly applied across borders 
throughout Europe.61 The rise of the merchant class in the eleventh and twelfth century influ-
enced the development of an obligation to act in good faith in contractual relationships.62 It 
was thought that the contractual relationship was governed by a general duty of the parties to 
act fairly.63 As in Roman law, good faith under the lex mercatoria significantly contributed to 
the kind of flexibility, convenience, and informality required by the international community of 
merchants.64  
 
B. The Common Law - Civil Law Divide 
With the incorporation of the lex mercatoria into the emerging national codifications of civil 
law in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the unified character of trade 
law, and with it the common understanding of the principle of good faith, disappeared.65 
Good faith, where it was still used, was tailored in order to comply with the specific require-
ments of the respective domestic body of law.66 The nationalisation of the law in Europe led 
to a situation that is commonly referred to as the common law - civil law divide. This term 
implies that domestic legal systems that adopted the common law share a common under-
standing of basic principles of the law that separates them from the legal systems of conti-
nental European countries, which are said to be closer to the tradition of Roman law. The 
differences between these two major legal cultures are often described in explicit language. 
For example, the civil law systems are said to differ from the common law systems as much 
                                                
59 Gordley, p. 95. 
60 Gordley, p. 108. 
61 Felemegas, p. 136. 
62 Klein, 15 Liverpool Law Review 115 at 117. 
63 Klein, 15 Liverpool Law Review 115 at 117. 
64 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 18. 
65 Cf. Felemegas, p. 137 with further references. 
66 Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws, p. 6. 
9 
as rationalism differs from empiricism or deduction from induction.67 This distinction is be-
lieved to be true in particular with respect to the principle of good faith. There seems to be a 
strong reluctance in common law jurisdictions to accept a general doctrine of good faith, 
whereas legal systems belonging to the civil law tradition are believed to have embraced 
good faith as an essential part of the law of contracts. More differentiating authors have ob-
served that the generalising distinction between common and civil law is often misleading as 
the attitude toward good faith within the two groups of legal systems is far from unequivocal. 
On the one hand, there are common law jurisdictions where the principle of good faith is in 
operation, such as the United States where the UCC Section 1-203 as well as the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts recognise a duty of the parties to a contract to act in good faith.68 
Other common law jurisdictions, which do not have legislative provisions dealing with good 
faith, are believed to be on the way to recognising a general doctrine of good faith, such as 
Australia and Canada.69 Hence, it has been concluded that good faith is finding increasing 
favour across the common law world.70 
 
In South Africa, a mixed jurisdiction,71 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the exceptio 
doli generalis - which was the nucleus of good faith in Roman law - does not form a part of 
the Roman-Dutch law,72 and, thus, cannot provide a remedy against the enforcement of un-
fair contract terms.73 Even after the demise of the exceptio doli generalis, South African 
courts have repeatedly stated that in modern South African law all contracts are bonae fi-
dei.74 However, the implications of this assertion are not clear. It seems, that the refusal of 
the enforcement of contracts on the grounds that they oppose public policy, is currently the 
most promising mechanism to 'keep the law in tune with the demands of equity',75 until the 
problem is solved by the legislator.76 
                                                
67 Cited by Veytia, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 1191. 
68 For a discussion of good faith in American contract law cf. e.g. Summers, p. 122 ff.; Farnsworth, Good Faith in 
Contract Performance; Farnsworth, 3 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 47 at 51 ff.; Powers, 18 J.L. Com. 333 at 339 f.; 
Burton, 94 Harvard Law Review 369 ff. 
69 Keily, 3 VJ 15 at 37 f. citing Priestley JA in Renard Constructions (ME) Pty v. Minister of Public Works (1992) 
26 NSW LR 234 at 268; cf. furthermore Farnsworth, 3 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 47 at 53 f. 
70 Juenger, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 1253 at 1257; Keily, 3 VJ 15 at 37; Felemegas, p. 184; more cautiously for English 
law Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 47 f. 
71 Mixed jurisdiction that applies (English) common law as well as civil law (in the case of South Africa Roman-
Dutch law). 
72 Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd. v De Ornelas [1988] 3 SA 580 (A).  
73 Christie, p. 15. 
74 Zimmermann, Good Faith and Equity, p. 240 with reference to the relevant case law in fn. 167. 
75 Zimmermann, Good Faith and Equity, p. 260. 
76 See for the proposed Control of Unreasonableness, Unconscionableness or Opressiveness in Contracts or 
Terms Act, Christie, p. 15 f. 
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On the other hand, civil law systems do not build a group of legal systems as homogeneous 
as might be concluded from the term common law - civil law divide. With respect to the prin-
ciple of good faith, there exist considerable differences in the acceptance and the use of 
good faith. The opposite ends of the scale within the civil law jurisdictions are Germany, with 
an extremely extensive use of good faith, and France and Italy with a considerable reluc-
tance toward the acceptance of a general doctrine of good faith.77 
 
However, an analysis of the position regarding good faith in selected domestic jurisdictions 
can help to understand the controversies surrounding the discussion of good faith on an in-
ternational level. For the purpose of such a comparison, German law78 and English law79 are 
the most interesting, as these legal systems are considered to represent the two extreme 
positions under the common law - civil law divide. 
 
I. Treu und Glauben in German Law 
Germany is believed to have the most broadly developed general doctrine of good faith 
within, Western legal systems, 'Treu und Glauben'.80 It will be shown that, although the word-
ing of the provisions dealing with the principle of good faith in the BGB81 implies a rather nar-
row scope,82 judicial practice has turned good faith into an overruling principle of law that 
reaches far beyond the wording of the provisions of the BGB,83 and that builds an 'open' 
norm where general values of German law find their way into the civil law.84 German scholars 
try to systematise the general doctrine of good faith in German law in an 'inner-system' of so 
called Fallgruppen.85From the body of case law that emerged under the principle of Treu und 
Glauben, different functions of Treu und Glauben can be distinguished.86  
 
                                                
77 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 48 ff. See for a detailed comparision between good faith in French and German 
law Sonnenberger, Treu und Glauben ein supranationaler Grundsatz?, p. 703 ff. 
78 See section I below. 
79 See section II below. 
80 Farnsworth, 3 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 47 at 50; Powers, 18 JLCOM 333 at 335. 
81 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code), entered into force on 1 January 1900, commonly referred to by 
its abbreviation 'BGB'. 
82 See section 1 below. 
83 See section 2 below. 
84 See section 3 below. 
85 See section 4 below. 
86 See section 5 below. 
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1. Legislative Provisions 
In exercising jurisdiction, German courts are bound to apply the written law.87 Hence, they 
depend on a Rechtsgrundlage, which is a norm that either creates, restricts, suspends, or 
extinguishes a right. The main provision of good faith is found at the beginning of the general 
provisions of the law of obligations: § 242 BGB stipulates that 
The debtor is bound to perform according to the requirements of good faith, ordinary 
usage being taken into consideration.88 
The second provision that expressly mentions good faith is § 157 BGB: 
Contracts shall be interpreted according to the requirements of good faith, ordinary 
usage being taken into consideration.89 
Section 242 BGB directly specifies the obligations of the parties to a contract, whereas § 157 
BGB is directed to the judge who has to interpret the provisions of the contract. This distinc-
tion is not always followed in German court practice, and both provisions are often cited to-
gether as a reference to a general doctrine of good faith.90 
 
2. The Scope of Application of § 242 BGB 
Taken literally, § 242 BGB refers only to how the debtor must perform.91 However, German 
courts extend the scope of § 242 BGB beyond its wording and impose an obligation on the 
creditor to exercise his rights under consideration of good faith.92 Furthermore, the system-
                                                
87 German courts have also to apply customary law (Gewohnheitsrecht). However, this refers mainly to customs 
created before the BGB came into force. Emerging new customary law, in order to become legally binding, is 
after the coming into force of the BGB also dependent on a Rechtsgrundlage. Some of the legal doctrines de-
veloped on the basis of Treu und Glauben are, today, recognised as Gewohnheitsrecht (e.g. the debtor's duty 
to disclose information in order to give the creditor the possibility to specify his claim, cf. v. Weichs/Foerstl, 
ZUM 2000, 897 at 898). However, § 242 BGB was necessary for their creation as there was no other Rechts-
grundlage. 
88 [Leistung nach Treu und Glauben: Der Schuldner ist verpflichtet, die Leistung so zu bewirken, wie Treu und 
Glauben mit Rücksicht auf die Verkehrssitte es erfordern.] It should be noted that the term Treu und Glauben, 
literally tranlated, means 'fidelity and faith'. The translation 'faith and credit' is also used, cf. e.g. Farnsworth, 3 
Tul. J. Int'l & Comp.L. 47 at 50 (fn. 16), and Powers, 18 JLCOM 333 at 337. Although Treu und Glauben is in 
substance the German equivalent to bona fides or good faith, German jurists are reluctant to use the transla-
tion 'good faith' in order to avoid confusion as the literal translation of good faith 'guten Glaubens' or 'gut-
gläubig' is used in the BGB exclusively for cases of a bona fides acquisition of a right or a title (gutgläubiger 
Erwerb) which is not connected in any way to the general doctrine of Treu und Glauben. Zimmer-
mann/Whittaker, p. 30, refer, in order to avoid confusion, to 'objective good faith' meaning Treu und Glauben 
und 'subjective good faith' with respect to guter Glaube. Since it is, however, very unlikely that such 
confusions will emerge within the scope of this thesis, Treu und Glauben will nevertheless be translated gen-
erally with 'good faith' to show the close relation to bona fides and good faith. 
89 [Verträge sind so auszulegen, wie Treu und Glauben mit Rücksicht auf die Verkehrssitte es erfordern.] 
90 Ebke/Steinhauer, p. 171. 
91 Ebke/Steinhauer, p. 171. 
92 Larenz, p. 109; Ebke/Steinhauer, p. 171. 
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atic position of § 242 BGB within the general law of obligations implies that good faith re-
quires the existence of a contract or another form of legal obligation. However, judicial prac-
tice applies § 242 BGB in order to impose duties on the parties in situations where there is 
no binding contract: before a legal obligation comes into existence,93 after a contract has 
been performed (post contractum finitum),94 and where a contract was null and void from the 
beginning on.95 Beyond the law of obligations, § 242 BGB is applied not only in the entire civil 
law, including the law of things, family law, labour law and law of corporations, but also, with 
alterations and specifications, in procedural law, public law and taxation law.96 
 
Good faith according to § 242 BGB is peremptory, and therefore parties to a contract cannot 
limit or exclude duties deriving from the general principle of good faith.97 Moreover, German 
courts do not regard § 242 BGB as a provision within the same hierarchy as other provisions 
of the BGB. Instead, it is seen as a superior legal principle that has the power to restrict the 
scope of other provisions if they lead to a result contradictory to good faith.98  
 
3. Determining Treu und Glauben 
§ 242 BGB is called a 'general clause' or 'open norm' (Generalklausel), as there is no clear 
requirement of a norm (Tatbestand) that has to be fulfilled in order to cause a certain legal 
consequence stipulated by the norm once its requirements are fulfilled (Rechtsfolge).99 The 
legal consequences are, thus, to be determined on a case-to-case basis with consideration 
of the different interests of the parties, and can, with respect to contracts, reach from an al-
teration of the original contract provision to the complete invalidity of the contract.100 
 
The wording of § 242 BGB implies that the norm is divided in a normative part (Treu und 
Glauben) and a factual part (Verkehrssitte, i.e. common usage). One would assume that both 
parts play a role in the application of good faith by German courts. However, a look at the 
                                                
93 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 24; Larenz, p. 91 f. 
94 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 24; Larenz, p. 117. 
95 Roth, § 242, sec. 53. 
96 Roth, § 242, sec. 56 - 82; Larenz, p. 107. 
97 Larenz, p. 107. 
98 Larenz, p. 107 f., citing the seminal decision of the Reichsgericht (German Imperial Court) RGZ 85, 108, 117. 
99 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 31. 
100 Cf. e.g. Larenz/Wolf, § 38, sec. 42 - 48. There seems to be a tendency in the German case law that shows 
similarities to the favor contractus rule that is said to be general principle under the CISG as the German 
courts in general try to maintain the contract through alteration as long as possible. The invalidation of the 
whole contract is seen as the ultima ratio. 
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judicial practice reveals that an empirical evaluation of existing usage is not conducted, and 
that, if the reasoning refers to usage at all, the experiences or beliefs of the deciding judge 
take the place of common usage.101 
 
The fact that Treu und Glauben imposes a normative standard leads to the conclusion that 
subjective elements, such as intent, negligence, or knowledge are not requirements for the 
application of § 242 BGB. However, subjective elements can play a role where a balance of 
two legitimate interests must be reached.102 
 
In deciding the specific case, the judge must try to identify distinctive values, or value judge-
ments, made by the legislator in provisions connected with the case.103 In particular, the way 
in which the legislator evaluates and solves a certain conflict may allow inferences as to 
more general values and standards which can be used to interpret Treu und Glauben.104 An 
example is the right to terminate long-term contractual relationships with reference to an 'im-
portant reason' without the necessity to observe a (contractual or statutory) period of no-
tice.105 Although the doctrine was based on § 242 BGB, specific provisions granting such a 
right for certain types of contracts were used to deduce the general principle.106 Furthermore, 
since the promulgation of the German democratic constitution, the Grundgesetz, after the 
second world war, the judge applying § 242 BGB is bound by the system of values stipulated 
in the constitution.107 This refers predominantly to the catalogue of human and civil rights 
(Art. 1 - 19 Grundgesetz)108 but also includes general principles such as the reference to 
Germany as a welfare state.109 These constitutional values, and their interpretation by the 
German constitutional court are thought to represent the common system of values the 
best.110 Hence, as there is no evaluation of the actual 'common usage' as is required by the 
                                                
101 Roth, § 242, sec. 6; Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws, p. 18. 
102 Roth, § 242, sec. 33 f. 
103 Roth, § 242, sec. 86 f. 
104 Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws, p. 18. 
105 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 26 f. 
106 These contracts comprised leases of accommodation (§ 554a BGB); contracts of services (§ 626 BGB), and 
partnership agreements (§ 723 BGB). With the reform of the law of obligations with effect from1 January 2002, 
this principle has been codified in § 314 BGB and is, therefore, an example for a legal doctrine that was origi-
nally developed by courts under the 'umbrella' of § 242 BGB and, subsequently, grew into a doctrine by its 
own with clear requirements, the latter to an extent that the legislator adopted the principles developed by ju-
dicial practice without alteration. Cf. to the role of § 242 BGB as the forerunner of statutory provisions section 
5 below.  
107 Roth, § 242, sec. 36 ff. 
108 Roth, § 242, sec. 36. 
109 Roth, § 242, sec. 37. 
110 Roth, § 242, sec. 36. 
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wording of § 242 BGB. The basic constitutional values provide the civil judge with a set of 
criteria, he can, and must, fall back on in the absence of more specific guidelines. 
 
Nevertheless, these ways of approaching good faith remain somewhat vague. Thus, it does 
not come as a surprise that attempts to define or specify its meaning with the use of other 
terms fail as they merely replace one unclear term with another.111 Hence, attempts to define 
the term Treu und Glauben in a positive way are no longer seriously pursued 112 This shows 
that the deductive approach to good faith, i.e. to try to define a general principle and then to 
specify it with logical argumentation, does not lead to results. Consequently, it is presently 
common understanding that Treu und Glauben can only be determined with an inductive 
method: substantive doctrines within the general notion of good faith have to be developed 
on a case by case basis. Subsequently, generalisations with respect to a doctrine can be 
made form the existing case law.113 
 
4. The 'Inner-System' of Fallgruppen  
The development of Treu und Glauben by case law causes uncertainty. In order to promote 
predictability of justice doctrines of good faith are developed and systematised with the help 
of groups of cases, Fallgruppen.114 From a number of single cases a common denominator is 
determined, sufficiently coherent to build a doctrine with requirements that are as specific as 
a legislative provision would be.115 Different doctrines are then subsumed under a more gen-
eral, overreaching principle. With the help of Fallgruppen an 'inner-system' of § 242 BGB is 
built. Read from the general to the detailed, the following example could be made: Treu und 
Glauben consists of three main sub-groups: supplementary obligations,116 change of circum-
stances,117 and abuse of rights.118 Abuse of rights could be subdivided in venire contra fac-
                                                
111 This problem is of course not limited to the German doctrine of Treu und Glauben but also applies to good 
faith in other jurisdictions, see e.g. Powers, Defining the Undefinable: Good Faith and the United Nations Con-
vention on the Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 JLCOM 333 et seq. who states that 'good faith 
can be defined as an expectation of each party to a contract that the other will honestly and fairly perform his 
duties under the contract in a manner that is acceptable in the trade community.' and, in doing so, comes very 
close to the German § 242 BGB without adding much clarity. See for the methodological approach of the 
building of Fallgruppen section 5 below. 
112 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 30. 
113 Larenz, p. 109 f. 
114 There seems to be no adequate English translation and the German term Fallgruppen is, thus, consistently 
used in legal literature written in English in order to describe this method of systematisation. 
115 As specific as a provision from the BGB. It should be kept in mind, though, that the rules in codes in the civil 
law tradition are in general more abstract and far less detailed than legislation in common law systems. 
116 [Nebenfplichten]. 
117 [Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage]. After the reform of the law of obligations with effect from1 January 2002 
codified in § 313 BGB and no longer part of Treu und Glauben. 
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tum proprium;119 dolo agit, qui petit, quod statim redditurus est;120 unredlicher Erwerb der 
eigenen Rechtsstellung;121 Verbot der vorsätzlichen Schädigung;122 and Verwirkung.123 Ver-
wirkung has the following requirements: (i) the owner of a right has not exercised the right 
over a certain period; (ii) due to this omission, the other party could reasonably rely on the 
fact that the owner will not exercise his right in the future; and (iii) this reliance led the other 
party to make certain (monetary) dispositions it would not otherwise have made.124 
 
This way of systematising § 242 BGB is believed not only to facilitate the understanding of 
good faith, but also to increase the predictability of future decisions. This method to systema-
tise case law is rather obvious, and it has been said that Anglo-American lawyers will note 
the parallels with their legal system, where the judges found 'organising principles' of equity 
or conscience and declared specific rules on doctrines, such as estoppel and frustration.125 
The main difference between the common law approach and the Fallgruppen method seems 
to be that the predictability under the Fallgruppen method is thought to derive from the gen-
eralisation, whereas the common law 'piecemeal solution' achieves predictability from the 
restriction of the legal doctrine to the factual set-up the decided case was based on.  
 
5. Functions of Treu und Glauben 
From the Fallgruppen that have been built within § 242 BGB, three functions of the principle 
of good faith in German law can be distinguished: (a) an interpretive function in order to close 
gaps of minor importance in the contract or the law (minima non curat praetor); (b) a supple-
mentary function in order to fill gaps left open by the legislator or the contracting parties; and 
(c) a corrective function that leads to an alteration or non-appliance of written rules or con-
tract provisions by either restricting certain rights or by derogating from the written rules. It 
will be seen that this distinction can be helpful in order to understand the discussion about 
the scope of good faith within Art. 7 CISG. 
 
 
                                                
118 [Rechtsmißbrauch]. 
119 Prohibition of inconsistent behaviour. 
120 Prohibition to claim if the claimed would have to be given back immediately. 
121 Prohibition to exercise a right that, though valid, has been acquired fraudulently. 
122 Prohibition to exercise a right with the only intention to harm the other party. 
123 Suspension of a right because it was not exercised timely even before it is formally prescribed. 
124 See for the requirements of Verwirkung in detail e.g. Larenz/Wolf, § 16, sec. 57 ff. 
125 O'Connor, p. 88. 
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(a) Interpretative Function 
As even the most detailed code or contract cannot deal with every eventuality, the details of 
minor importance can and must be left to the courts' interpretation (minima non curat prae-
tor). This is the function which the German legislator intended and is reflected by the wording 
of § 242 BGB, an example being whether the creditor must accept performance outside of-
fice hours.126 In contrast to the supplementary function, under the interpretative functin the 
parties or the law made a decision in principle, but left the details of the modus of perform-
ance of the obligation open. 
 
(b) Supplementary Function 
Supplementary rights or duties are not expressly provided in the contract or the legislation. 
The supplementary function is concerned with gaps in the contract, where a solution was not 
even provided in principle, as neither the legislator nor the parties to the contract thought 
about the problem.127 This supplementary function of good faith is not covered by the word-
ing of § 242 BGB but was developed and is constantly applied by German courts.128 From 
the German judicial practice typical ancillary and supplementary duties emerged.129 These 
duties are imposed on the parties of the contract in order to ensure that the contractual pur-
pose can be fulfilled.130 Despite the fact that the parties to a contract have partly adverse 
interests, German courts require a party to co-operate and to act with consideration and care 
for the other party before, during and after the performance of the contractual obligations.131 
Hence, it can be said that the supplementary function of good faith is in substance a notion of 
equity.132 It can also be said that the supplementary function complements the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda as it helps to maintain the contract where the gap would otherwise lead 
to failure. 
 
 
 
                                                
126 Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws, p. 9; Larenz, p. 109; Hartkamp, 
3 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 65 at 67. 
127 Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws, p. 9 f. 
128 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 24. 
129 [Vertragliche Nebenpflichten und Fürsorgepflichten.] See for a comprehensive listing of different duties devel-
oped by German courts: Roth, § 242, sec. 142 – 223. 
130 Larenz, p. 115. 
131 Larenz, p. 115. 
132 Hartkamp, 3 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 65 at 67. 
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(c) Corrective Function 
The most extensive function of good faith in German law is that § 242 BGB is used as a ba-
sis for new remedies that are not provided for in the code or the contract.133 These remedies 
can lead to new legal doctrines of contract law, causing results the legislator could not or did 
not want to stipulate in the written law.134 The most famous example being the introduction of 
the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, a variation of the clausula rebus sic stan-
tibus, despite the fact that the draftsmen of the BGB expressly abstained from inserting a 
provision dealing with the change of circumstances after the conclusion of the contract.135 
Doctrines were also developed to restrict the parties in exercising a right they have been 
expressly granted either by contract clauses or legislative provisions.136 As examples, the 
doctrines of Rechtsmißbrauch (‘abuse of rights’) and Verwirkung (suspension of a right be-
cause it was not exercised timely) may be mentioned. Hence, the application of § 242 BGB 
by German courts goes beyond the mere ‘completion of the legislative plan’, and amounts to 
a correction of the law as laid down by the draftsmen of the BGB.137 and Treu und Glauben is 
used to develop the law praeter legem. It is this direct interference with the declared inten-
tions of the legislator that makes the third function of good faith in German law one of the 
most contentious in the discussion of good faith in international trade.138 
 
It should be noted, however, that the German courts and writers try to avoid simply relying on 
the general provision of § 242 BGB when they develop a new legal doctrine. The preferred 
method is to isolate a common idea in a number of specific provisions and to deduce a gen-
eral principle from them. This method of a Gesamtanalogie (general analogy) is believed to 
be closer to the 'legislative plan' as the reliance on general ideas of equity and fairness.139 
 
                                                
133 Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws, p. 15. 
134 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 26. 
135 Roth, § 242, sec. 471 f. 
136 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 26. 
137 Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws, p. 16; Zimmermann/Whittaker, 
p. 26. 
138 Hartkamp, 3 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 65 at 67. 
139 Cf. Larenz/Wolf, § 4, sec. 69. 
18 
II. Good Faith in English Law 
1. The Absence of a General Doctrine of Good Faith 
The discussion of good faith in contemporary English law usually starts with the assumption 
that there a general doctrine of good faith in English contract law does not exist.140 The 'high 
watermark' of good faith in English contract law is seen in a frequently quoted141 statement 
made by Lord Mansfield in 1766, still under the influence of good faith as it was understood 
in the ius commune and the lex mercatoria, that 
'[t]he governing principle is applicable to all contracts and dealings. Good faith for-
bids either party by concealing what the he privately knows, to draw the other into a 
bargain, from his ignorance of that fact, and his believing the contrary.'142 
This position changed by the nineteenth century and the theory of the freedom of contract 
prevailed. In essence, freedom of contract meant that only the parties to the contract could 
define their rights and duties. Therefore, judicial supervision over contractual terms had to be 
restricted to a minimum in order to attain the highest degree of stability and predictability so 
that the parties could rely on the binding effect of their agreement.143 Contractual justice was 
seen as honouring the parties' agreement without scrutinising its substantial content.144 The 
predictability of the outcome of a court dispute over contractual terms was, and as the dis-
cussions about good faith in the CISG show, still is of the utmost importance. The German 
judicial practice endeavours to grant justice in every individual case (Einzelfallgerechtig-
keit),145 whereas the English concept of contractual justice seems to be a more general one, 
as it is believed that vague concepts of fairness can make judicial decisions unpredictable.146 
Even if the outcome of a dispute is sometimes hard on a party, this is regarded as an ac-
ceptable price to pay in the interest of the great majority of business litigants.147 Due to the 
                                                
140 O'Connor, p. 18.; Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 3 (with comprehensive references in footnote 200); Beat-
son/Friedman, p. 14; Felegemas, p. 180. 
141 Cf. e.g. Keily, 3 VJ 15 at 36; Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 42; Farnsworth, Good Faith in Contract Performance, 
p. 154. 
142 Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 at 1910. 
143 Beatson/Friedman, p. 9 f. 
144 Beatson/Friedman, p. 9. 
145 It might be worth noting that the German Civil Code BGB was drafted under the same prevailing influence of 
the theory of freedom of contract. However, German courts were willing to accept that the theory of freedom of 
contract did not comply with the realities of the early twentieth century. Moreover it is submitted that the 'birth 
defects' of the BGB with regard to the law of delict and the unwillingness of the legislator to react, thus, might 
have led to the fact that German courts were more readily and earlier willing to interfere with the contractual 
relations than their English counterparts. 
146 Felegemas, p. 186. 
147 Felegemas, p. 186. 
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prevailing influence of the principle of freedom of contract, the role of equity in English con-
tract law is modest.148  
 
However, English courts were faced with the same conflict between strict rules and justice as 
the courts in civil law systems, such as, unequal bargaining power, the change of circum-
stances after the conclusion of the contract, and the exercise of contractual rights that are 
contrary to the original purpose of the contract. Although the classical principles of equity 
with their discretionary remedies and the ability to subvert common law rules, do not apply to 
contracts,149 equitable notions have found their way into contract law in the form of particular 
doctrines. These doctrines are used to correct harsh consequences deriving from a pure 
application of the principle of freedom of contract.150 Rather than to rely on a general princi-
ple of 'good faith', 'reasonableness', or 'fair dealing and honesty in fact', more technical doc-
trines were invented in order to guarantee the maximum amount of predictability possible.151 
It will be seen that these doctrines serve the same functions which are attributed to Treu und 
Glauben in German law. 
 
2. Implied Terms 
As stated above, the theory of the freedom of contract relies on the responsibility of the par-
ties to the contract. Hence, it seems to be a logical step to close the gaps in a contract by 
detecting the will of the parties. Where there are no expressed terms that can be interpreted, 
courts may imply 'terms in fact'.152 To ask to what the parties agreed to expressly or tacitly, is 
a factual inquiry, as the actual intentions of the parties are examined. However, if there are 
no circumstances that could reveal the parties actual intentions, English courts resort to 'rea-
sonable' expectations of the parties.153 Although the courts will not imply a term simply to 
make the contract more fair than negotiated between the parties,154 fairness and reasonable-
ness have been invoked to imply terms in appropriate cases.155 In doing so, the courts apply 
                                                
148 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 38; Beatson/Friedman, p. 10. 
149 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 44; Beatson/Friedman, p. 10. 
150 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 44 f.; Beatson/Friedman, p. 10. 
151 O'Connor, p. 19. 
152 Cf. Treitel, p. 184 ff. 
153 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 45 f.; O'Connor, p. 19. The terminology used varies and comprises the 'officious 
bystander' and standards of 'business efficacy' but in essence refer to what 'reasonable' parties would have 
agreed to if they had been aware of the problem at the time of the conclusion of the contract, cf. Treitel, 
p. 184 f. 
154 Beatson/Friedman, p. 8. 
155 O'Connor, p. 32. 
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a normative standard to the contract interpretation rather than a factual one, even if the im-
plication of a term is justified with local customs or mercantile usage as a form of 'presumed 
consensus'.156 
 
Moreover, English courts not only imply terms in fact but also 'terms in law'. The latter cannot 
be traced back to a presumed intention of the parties. Hence it was held that terms implied in 
law are '[b]ased on wider considerations, for a term which the law will imply as a necessary 
incident of a definable category of contractual relationship.'157 This means that terms implied 
in law do not derive from the parties' agreement but are considered inherent to a certain type 
of contract.158 Thus, one cannot help but notice the similarities between terms implied in law 
and the conduct of German courts - under the regime of § 242 - to impose supplementary 
legal duties on the parties to a contract, whether or not the parties intended to be bound by 
such duties.159 
 
However, a term cannot be implied so as to supersede the express terms of the contract.160 
Consequently, the implication of contract terms cannot fulfil the corrective function of good 
faith as it is not possible to restrict a party to exercise contractual rights. 
 
3. Promissory Estoppel 
Promissory estoppel161 is an equitable doctrine that may serve in order to restrict a party in 
the exercise of an existing contractual right,162 it cannot, however, serve in order to create 
new obligations between the parties.163 Promissory estoppel is closely linked with the doc-
trine of consideration in English law: where a promise is not legally binding due to a lack of 
consideration, the promisee can raise promissory estoppel as a defence with the effect that 
                                                
156 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 45 f.; O'Connor, p. 19. 
157 Cf. e.g. Scally v Southern Health & Social Services Board [1992] 1 A.C. 294 at 307; Mahmud v B.C.C.I. [1998] 
A.C. 20 at 45. 
158 Cf. in detail Treitel, p. 190 ff. 
159 See also Hartkamp, 3 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 65, who describes implied terms in common law as the equiva-
lent to the supplementary function of good faith. 
160 O'Connor, p. 19 with reference to Les Affreteurs Reunis S.A. v Leopold Walford (London) Ltd. [1919] A.C. 
801. 
161 The terminology for this doctrine is not consistent. In order to avoid confusion with the common law doctrines 
of estoppel by representation of fact, promissory estoppel is often referred to as 'equitable estoppel' or 'equi-
table forbearance', cf. in detail e.g. Wilken/Villiers, sec. 12.05. Furthermore, the point has been made that 
English courts sometimes use the expression 'waiver' as interchangeable with 'promissory estoppel', cf. Tre-
itel, p. 109 with further references. 
162 Wilken/Villiers, sec. 11.01; Treitel, p. 100. 
163 Wilken/Villiers, sec. 12.10; Treitel, p. 105 f. 
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the promise will be upheld and the promisor will not be permitted to enforce his original con-
tractual right.164 The cumulative requirements of promissory estoppel are that: (i) in an exist-
ing legal relationship a party makes a clear and unequivocal representation to another party, 
(ii) the representation is that the promisor's legal rights will not be enforced or will be sus-
pended, (iii) that the promisee relies on the promise and alters its position to its detriment 
and that (iv) the promisor seeks to withdraw the promise, and that this withdrawal is consid-
ered inequitable.165 The promise can be made expressly, including by conduct, and even by 
silence provided that there is a duty to act.166 
 
Two observations are of interest with regard to the general principle of good faith. Firstly, 
English courts seem to apply an objective standard in determining whether or not the prom-
ise was made clearly and unequivocally, as it is sufficient that the promise induces the pro-
misee 'reasonably' to believe that the other party will not insist on its strict legal rights.167 
Secondly, the withdrawal of the promise must be 'inequitable', a test that requires the judge 
to consider all circumstances of the specific case, such as the commercial experience of the 
parties or other obligations they have to fulfil.168  
 
Thus, the conclusion has been made that promissory estoppel should be seen as cases 
where fairness and reasonableness demand that strict legal rights and 'normal' legal rules 
can, and should, be overridden.169 In this context, it is not so important whether or not the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel can be considered part of a general doctrine of good faith.170 
Instead, the pivotal point is that promissory estoppel in English law is used to resolve a con-
flict between strict law and justice. The same conflict is dealt with in German law, under the 
doctrine of good faith in the form of venire contra factum proprium (inconsistent behaviour) 
and Verwirkung (suspension of a right because it was not exercised timely).171 
                                                
164 Wilken/Villiers, sec. 12.08; Treitel, p. 109. 
165 Wilken/Villiers, sec. 12.03; Treitel, p. 101 ff. 
166 Wilken/Villiers, sec. 8.164 and 12.16 f.; Treitel p. 103. 
167 Treitel, p. 101 (with reference to the leading cases in fn. 67); Wilken/Villiers, sec. 12.14 (with reference to case 
law in fn. 56). 
168 Wilken/Villiers, sec. 12.51 with reference to the relevant case law. 
169 O'Connor, p. 32. 
170 So O'Connor, p. 32. 
171 It should, however, be noted that in cases of an expressed promise good faith is unlikely to play a role in Ger-
man law: as the doctrine of consideration is not applicable, expressed promises are an alteration (variation) of 
the original contract, provided that the other party reasonably could have understood them to be made with 
Rechtsbindungswillen (intention to legally bind the promisor). Hence, Verwirkung normally deals with cases of 
conduct or silence. Moreover, it should be stated that the English view is contrary to the German doctrine of 
Verwirkung in that the mere failure to prosecute a claim timely cannot lead to the destruction of a contractual 
right, cf. Treitel, p. 103 with further references. 
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4. Economic Duress and Undue Influence 
Implied terms can impose additional obligations on the parties of a contract, and promissory 
estoppel can restrict the exercise of a contractual right, however these doctrines cannot alter 
the substance of an expressed term of a contract even where such a term is felt to be grossly 
unfair. In order to be able to exercise a certain control over unfair contractual terms, English 
judges have extended the common law doctrine of 'duress' from mere 'physical duress' to the 
acceptance of 'economic duress' as a reason to avoid a contract.172 Moreover, the equitable 
doctrine of undue influence was used in a number of cases in order to provide relief against 
unconscionable bargains.173 However, the effort to introduce a general relief against inequal-
ity of bargaining power was never accepted by English courts.174 Unlike other common law 
jurisdictions, England has not adopted a general doctrine of unconscionability was adopted 
but left the matter for the legislator and the introduction of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977. Hence, it is submitted that, although there are technical doctrines with respect to the 
control of unfair contractual terms, English courts were far more reluctant to rule into the ac-
tual contractual terms as agreed to by the parties than their German counterparts. 
 
5. Statutory Provisions 
The term 'good faith' is used in several statutes, particularly in the Sale of Goods Act 1979, 
but also the Bill of Exchange Act 1882, and the Marine Insurance Act 1906.175 Unlike in civil 
law jurisdictions, good faith is not used in a normative sense. It does not refer to an objective 
standard, such as 'reasonableness'. Good faith in the listed statutes is used subjectively and 
means essentially 'honesty in fact'.176 In referring to the subjective knowledge of a party to 
the contract, the party can act in good faith even if the conduct is objectively considered neg-
ligent.177 This use of the term good faith reminds one more of the German principle of gut-
gläubiger Erwerb than of the principle of Treu und Glauben.178  
 
                                                
172 Treitel, p. 375 f.; Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 47; O'Connor, p. 20; Birks/Chin Nyuk Yin, p. 64; Beat-
son/Friedman, p. 13. 
173 Treitel, p. 382. 
174 O'Connor, p. 20; Treitel, p. 384 f. 
175 Cf. O'Connor for a detailed discussion of the provisions in these Acts dealing with good faith. 
176 O'Connor, p. 39. 
177 O'Connor, p. 39. 
178 See section I, 2 above in fn. 38. 
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C. The UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts 
The scope of the UNIDROIT Principles for International Contracts ('the Principles') were final-
ised in the year 1994. The Principles are not restricted to the sale of goods but apply to all 
commercial contracts. Unlike the CISG, the Principles are not binding law. They can be seen 
as a restatement of principles of international contract law. The Principles were drafted ex-
clusively by academic scholars and can, thus, not be seen as trade customs.179 According to 
their Preamble, the Principles are thought to be applied: when the parties agree to them,180 
as a supplement if there is no choice of law, as a model for legislators, and to supplement 
international uniform law. The latter purpose becomes relevant in the discussion of good faith 
in the CISG.181 
 
The Principles are influenced by the continental European tradition of civil law. Conse-
quently, good faith plays an important role. As the Principles contain a number of provisions 
which refer to good faith, the principle of good faith is seen as one of the fundamental ideas 
underlying the Principles.182 Article 1.7 of the Principles, which contains the general principle 
of good faith, states that 
(1) Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing in interna-
tional trade. 
(2) The parties may not exclude or limit this duty. 
This provision makes it clear that, even in the absence of special provisions, the behaviour of 
the parties must always be in accordance with good faith. The reference to 'international 
trade' indicates that the standard of the respective trade must be considered and that a do-
mestic standard of good faith can only be applied if it is accepted among the various legal 
systems.183 
 
The Principles were revised184 in 2004 and the new version included a new Art. 1.8 (Inconsis-
tent behaviour), which states that 
                                                
179 The arbitral practice seems, however, to be divided, cf. for an overview over the relevant case law Farnsworth, 
The Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in International Commercial Arbitration, p. 21 at 26. 
180 Be it expressly or by reference to the lex mercatoria or general principles of law.  
181 For a detailed analysis whether the UNIDROIT Principles can help to determine good faith the CISG see 
Chapter 2 below. 
182 Cf. Official Commentary to the UNIDROIT Principles, UNIDROIT, Principles of International Commercial Con-
tracts, p. 16 f. 
183 Cf. Official Commentary to the UNIDROIT Principles, UNIDROIT, Principles of International Commercial Con-
tracts, p. 18. 
184 Though it is also asserted that the focus was more on enlargement than on revision, cf. Bonell, Unif. L. Rev. 
2004, p. 5 at 17. 
24 
A party cannot act inconsistently with an understanding it has caused the other party 
to have and upon which that other party reasonably has acted in reliance to its det-
riment. 
This manifestation of what in civil law jurisdictions is known as venire contra factum proprium 
is seen as part of the general principle of good faith.185 It was this importance of inconsistent 
behaviour in practice which made it advisable to specify its requirements.186 
 
D. Some general Conclusions about Good Faith 
It is conceded that a common core of good faith can neither be deduced from the history of 
good faith, or from a comparative analysis, in order to determine the meaning of good faith 
under the CISG. However, some general conclusions can be made in order to avoid misun-
derstandings that are present in the debate about good faith in the CISG. It is submitted that 
good faith is not a substantive concept that provides solutions, but only a method to find solu-
tions.187 As the substantive solutions found with the help of good faith cannot be deduced 
from the principle of good faith itself, good faith does not dilute the predictability of justice.188 
As the solutions for a problem determined with the help of good faith are not inevitable, good 
faith as such does not constitute a threat to the sanctity of the contract.189  
 
I. Good Faith: a Method not a Solution 
It seems that the general principle of good faith in civil law jurisdictions is sometimes seen as 
a coherent legal principle from which lawyers can directly divert the solution of a case. 
Hence, it has been stated 
'[...] that while good faith expresses itself in many different rules, it does so quite 
unsystematically [...]. It might have been expected that a concept formally enshrined 
in the Code, and subjected to much judicial consideration would have by now mani-
fested itself in a more coherent and systematic fashion.'190 
However, the better view is that good faith is neither a 'norm' in the common understanding, 
nor a legal 'doctrine' or 'principle' with an inherent substantive content. The observation has 
been made that the three functions of good faith - interpretation, supplementation and correc-
                                                
185 Bonell, Unif. L. Rev. 2004, p. 5 at 20. 
186 Bonell, Unif. L. Rev. 2004, p. 5 at 20. 
187 See section I below. 
188 See section II below. 
189 See section III below. 
190 O'Connor, p. 89. 
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tion - can be equated with the tasks and function of a judge, or a court in general.191 Although 
an inner system of good faith provisions, in the form of Fallgruppen, has been developed, it 
becomes clear that the specification of the substantial content of this inner system can only 
be achieved by the development and analysis of judge-made case law. Thus, the content of 
good faith provisions cannot be determined by an inner system but must come from 'outside' 
the provision.192 
 
On these grounds, it has been argued that good faith, even if contained in a written provision, 
is not a norm in the common meaning.193 All the specific sub-doctrines and sub-rules, which 
were developed under one of the three functions of § 242 BGB could, in their substance, 
survive without alteration or dilution of their specific content even if § 242 BGB would be 
abolished.194 It has also correctly been observed that doctrines and rules that were devel-
oped under § 242 BGB have no common denominator as they are concerned with a great 
variety of different problems. Therefore, it can often be regarded as arbitrary or as a matter of 
taste in legal reasoning whether a new doctrine is based on Treu und Glauben or on another 
general clause, or on an analogy with a number of specific provisions.195  
 
The aforesaid, in connection with the fact that at no time a helpful definition of a general prin-
ciple of good faith could be found, must lead to the conclusion that good faith is not so much 
needed in order to determine what justice, equity or reasonableness means with regard to a 
specific case, but in order to empower the judge to bring elements of justice into an, other-
wise closed, system of a contract or a codification. Judges in civil law jurisdictions, officially, 
do not have the same power to create new law196 or to set aside existing law and exercise 
equitable discretion ex lege as common law judges do.197 Moreover, the civil codes do not 
leave express space for the common law in case a gap is discovered.198 Hence, when it is 
stated that common law lawyers tend to read statutory instruments strictly and rely on case 
                                                
191 Hesselink, The Concept of Good Faith, p. 492. 
192 Hesselink, The Concept of Good Faith, p. 492. 
193 Hesselink, The Concept of Good Faith, p. 489 f. 
194 As far as these doctrines and rules are recognised as Gewohnheitsrecht (customary law) they could even 
survive technically as § 242 BGB as an 'anchor', 'mouthpiece' or 'cloak' of judge-made law is then no longer 
required. 
195 Cf. for the observation that the German courts try to exhaust other possibilities of creating new rule before 
they take resort to the most general way of taking § 242 BGB as Ermächtigungsgrundlage, Hesselink, The 
Concept of Good Faith, p. 496; Roth, § 242, sec. 20. 
196 Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 22 with further references in fn. 79. 
197 See for the application of ex lege rules in modern English contract law e.g. Beatson/Freeman, p. 16. 
198 Cf. Honnold, 8 Journal of Law and Commerce 207 at 208. 
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law to plug omissions,199 it must be stated that this alternative is not available to civil law 
judges. Consequently, a civil law judge, in the process of decision making and reasoning, 
looks for an existing rule of law that expressly grants the discretion or the possibility to create 
or correct the law.200 Thus, if there is no other express rule of law,201 good faith functions as a 
norm empowering the civil law judge not only to apply the law, but to create it.202  
 
II. Good Faith and the Predictability of Justice 
The aforesaid leads to the conclusion that good faith in civil law jurisdictions fulfils similar 
functions as equity in old English law or the ius honorarium in Roman law.203 Consequently, if 
one wants to compare the common law with the civil law, it is appropriate to compare 'good 
faith' with 'equity' and not with specific technical rules, be it equitable doctrines or common 
law rules, which are applied in order to correct the strict rules of the contract.204 If one wants 
to compare the technical rules of contract law in common law systems with good faith, then 
the object of the comparison must be an equally specific sub-doctrine, one of the Fallgrup-
pen, under the 'umbrella' of good faith. Hence, one would compare promissory estoppel with 
venire contra factum proprium, or economical duress with Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage. 
In doing so, one will realise that doctrines, stored in textbooks under the label 'good faith', are 
neither more nor less precise or innovative than the technical rules in English contract law. 
Taking German law as an example, judiciary in close co-operation with academics, try to 
develop doctrines that emerge from a case-by-case basis into doctrines with requirements 
                                                
199 Sim, sec. IV, B, 2. 
200 There are different reasons for the limited power of judges in civil law jurisdictions. In Germany the BGB was 
drafted with the approach to create a closed system of rules that would provide the judge with an answer for 
every problem, cf. Larenz/Wolf, § 2, sec. 99. Today, the judge is, furthermore, bound by the constitution to ap-
ply the law (and not to decide beside or against it). In France, the Civil Code was designed to supersede the 
law of the ancien régime. To guard against back sliding, judges were required to anchor decisions in some ar-
ticle of the code, cf. Honnold, 1 Int'l Trade and Business L. J. 1 at 2. 
201 Such as e.g. contained in section 1 of the Swiss Civil Code: 'The Law must be applied in all cases which come 
within the letter or the spirit of any of its provisions. Where no provision is applicable, the judge shall decide 
according to existing Customary Law and, in default thereof, according to the rules which he would lay down if 
he had himself to act as legislator. [...]'. 
202 With regard to § 242 BGB there remains of course the problem that the norm, according to its wording, only 
covers the performance of the debtor, and does not build an Ermächtigungsgrundlage for the judge to correct 
the law. Hence, the law (§ 242 BGB) was contra legem corrected by judges in order to provide other German 
judges with an Ermächtigungsgrundlage in order to correct the law in other cases. 
203 Hesselink, The Concept of Good Faith, p. 493. Cf. for old English law, as one of many, e.g. Felemegas, 
p. 185: 'It is sufficient to say that the rules of Equity - originally administered in the King's Court by the Chan-
cellor - evolved in order to undo the injustices frequently caused by the rigidity of the old common law, either 
by restraining common law remedies, or by giving remedies which were not given by the old common law, 
such as specific performance or rescission of a contract for a non-fraudulent misrepresentation.' 
204 It has, correctly, been stated that, thus, '[i]t does not make any more sense for a common law lawyer to fight 
the concept of good faith than it would have been to fight the whole of equity.', cf. Hesselink, The Concept of 
Good Faith, p. 498. 
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similar to those provided by written rules of the BGB. It is not unusual that a doctrine devel-
ops to a point where it, first, becomes independent of the § 242 BGB, and then, eventually, 
when it is specific enough and has proven to be workable, it is adopted by the legislator as a 
written rule of law.205 
 
In contrast, the technical rules developed in modern English contract law, be it common law 
or equitable doctrines, are by no means as clear as pretended.206 It has correctly been ob-
served that the 'piecemeal' solutions of the common law can tempt one either to impose a 
unity to a doctrine that does not exist, or not to recognise links between individual cases.207 
 
The question regarding the circumstances under which a new good faith doctrine emerges, 
and to what extent it interferes with contractual terms or existing law, is not determined by a 
principle or a general doctrine of good faith, but by the specific circumstances and shortcom-
ings of the respective system of law. Hence, this decision is not made by the application of a 
substantive norm, but by the judges who exercise their discretion and determine what good 
faith means in order to exercise justice. Hence, the statement that 
'[T]he position of English courts is that vague concepts of fairness can make judicial 
decisions unpredictable. If that means that the outcome of disputes is sometimes 
hard on a party, then it is regarded as an acceptable price to pay in the interest of 
the great majority of business litigants.'208 
may be true insofar as civil law judges might have a tendency to put more emphasis on 
Einzelfallgerechtigkeit (justice in the specific case), and that they are not willing to deny jus-
tice to an individual in order to serve the interests of a group. This, however, is not attribut-
able to good faith but to the willingness of the courts to extend the interference with contract 
terms.209 
 
It has been shown above that German courts develop specific doctrines under § 242 BGB to 
an extent that they are comparable in their precision to written provisions of the BGB. Thus, 
doctrines that were developed, using good faith as a 'mouthpiece', or as an 'anchor' do not 
                                                
205 This has recently been proven by the reform of the German law of obligations where the good faith doctrines 
of Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage (change of circumstances) and Kündigung aus wichtigem Grund (termina-
tion due to severe cause) as developed by the courts were almost unchanged included in the code, cf. §§ 313, 
314 BGB 
206 See e.g. the preface to Wilken/Villiers, Waiver, Variation and Estoppel, p. xvii, stating that the book '[...] has its 
origins in the frustration that is felt by practitioners and academics alike in tackling the doctrines [...] these doc-
trines are frequently relied on but less frequently analysed and understood'. 
207 M. I. Mustill in the foreword to Wilken/Villiers, Waiver, Variation and Estoppel, p. xv. 
208 Felemegas, p. 186. 
209 See section III below. 
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affect predictability more than the technical rules developed under common law. It is of 
course true that it is sometimes hard to predict when a new doctrine under good faith starts 
to emerge. The same can be said, however, from the development of the technical doctrines 
in English law: the parties of the dispute were probably quite surprised when the English 
courts, for the first time, accepted economic duress as a defence, and did not anticipate this 
outcome of the proceedings during their contract negotiations.  
 
III. Good Faith and the Sanctity of Contract 
Within the common law tradition there is a widespread belief that a general principle of good 
faith would undermine the theory of freedom of contract as it would ignore the intentions of 
the parties.210 
 
1. The Rule and the Exception from the Rule 
It is true that good faith in civil law systems is, now, used to counterbalance the sometimes 
harsh results of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, it can be stated that in the continental Euro-
pean legal systems the emancipation of good faith occurred simultaneously with the decline 
of party autonomy.211 However, this can be seen as a coincidence of legal history, as the 
contract law of most Western legal systems was heavily influenced by the concept of free-
dom of contract.212 It has correctly been stated that, if the civil law will come under the influ-
ence of more social doctrines, good faith might in the future just as well be invoked by courts 
in order to reinforce the rule of pacta sunt servanda.213 Hence, the question of what good 
faith is depends to a great extent on what is the rule and what is the exception. The answers 
to this question can change with time and political and social values, as law does not exist in 
a vacuum. 
 
2. Good Faith and the Need for Protection 
It is correct to say that German courts have intervened to a greater extent with the substan-
tive obligations of the contract of the parties than English courts have. However, it should be 
noted that the intervention only took place if there was a typical imbalance of the bargaining 
                                                
210 Cf. Juenger, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 1253 at 1254: 'Such discretion, however, can hardly appeal to those who have 
been weaned on the notion that judges cannot make a contract for the parties.' 
211 Hesselink, The Concept of Good Faith, p. 495 (fn. 146). 
212 See for German law e.g. Larenz/Wolf, § 2, sec. 37 - 99. 
213 Hesselink, The Concept of Good Faith, p. 495 f. 
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power. Thus, German courts considered whether or not a specific group typically involved in 
certain contracts, particularly 'consumers', were in need of protection.214 Consequently, the 
interference was far less when both parties were traders and it had to be assumed that they 
could negotiate the terms of their contract 'at arms length'. This fact has to be considered in 
the discussion about good faith in the CISG, as the CISG does not apply to consumer con-
tracts (Art. 2(a) CISG). Hence, when reference is made to the extensive interference with 
contract terms under good faith in German law, it should be born in mind that the interference 
is far less when both parties are deemed to be experienced traders. 
 
E. The Functional Approach to Good Faith 
The lesson that can be learned from this chapter is that there is no way to deduce the con-
tent and scope of a general principle of good faith from the provisions it is stated in. Good 
faith evades a meaningful definition. However, this does not lead to a lack of predictability or 
necessarily to an extensive interference with the contract terms agreed to by the parties, as 
there is no 'inner-system' of good faith that predetermines such a result. 
 
The more promising approach to good faith seems to lie in the functions good faith can fulfil: 
the interpretation, the supplementation, and the correction of rules, be it legislation or con-
tract provisions. Such a functional approach to good faith complies with the role good faith 
played throughout the centuries in all jurisdictions that used this device: to come to a just 
result where the written rules cannot achieve this task. Hence, the prediction can be made, 
that attempts to define a coherent substantive doctrine of good faith in the CISG will fail as 
they have failed before in domestic law and that, thus, only a functional approach can attrib-
ute a plausible meaning to good faith in the CISG. 
 
Furthermore, it has been seen that good faith does not play a role at all in jurisdictions, such 
as England, where the functions of good faith are administered by other legal means. It can, 
thus, be said that the principle of good faith is subsidiary to other legal instruments. The 
South African example shows that, if good faith is nevertheless treated as part of the civil 
law, there exists great uncertainty about the tasks good faith should be used for. With regard 
to the CISG this means that the role of good faith will be determined by other possibilities 
which the CISG provides in order to fill gaps in the law, or to correct unjust rules. 
                                                
214 This applies e.g. to the control of standard terms and conditions which is much stricter if one party is a con-
sumer (cf. § 310 BGB, the substantive rules of which were developed under § 242 BGB) and to the control of 
consumer credit clauses (§ 491 BGB). 
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Chapter 2: The CISG and the General Principle of Good Faith 
The CISG uses the term 'good faith' in Art. 7(1). However, the functions, meaning and scope 
of good faith in the CISG are highly contentious. In the following chapter, an overview over 
the good faith provisions in the CISG is given,215 and different ways of reasoning with regard 
to the acceptance of a general principle of good faith in the CISG are analysed.216 The result 
of the analysis is that a coherent substantive concept of good faith cannot be deduced from 
the CISG provisions but that good faith can only be determined according to its functions 
(functional approach). Furthermore, it is submitted that good faith is subsidiary to other legal 
instruments. Thus, other possibilities which the CISG provides in order to enable courts and 
tribunals to exercise the three functions deduced from the principle of good faith in a domes-
tic understanding will be examined.217 
 
A. Manifestations of Good Faith in the CISG 
The term good faith is mentioned exclusively in Art. 7(1) CISG, which deals with the interpre-
tation of the Convention. However, it is argued that good faith is a tacit general principle of 
the Convention under Art. 7(2) CISG. Furthermore, specific provisions of the CISG are seen 
as a manifestation of good faith, even though they do not use the term 'good faith', as they 
impose an objective standard on the behaviour of the contract parties.218 
 
I. Article 7 CISG 
The CISG uses the term 'good faith' only in Art. 7(1). The complete Art. 7 CISG reads: 
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international 
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the obser-
vance of good faith in international trade. 
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not ex-
pressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on 
which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law ap-
plicable by virtue of the rules of private international law. 
At first site, the provision seems to be clear. The determination of the scope of good faith in 
the CISG is, however, made difficult by the fact that Art. 7(1) CISG had no predecessors in 
                                                
215 See section A below. 
216 See section B below. 
217 See section C below. 
218 Cf. UNCITRAL; Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Text of 
Secretariat Commentary on article 6 of the 1978 Draft, sec. 4. 
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the 1964 Hague Conventions; and that the wording of Art. 7(1) CISG is the result of a com-
promise between the opposing interests of common law and civil law systems.219 
 
Relative unity exists about the fact that the wording of Art. 7(1) CISG contains two restric-
tions with regard to the scope of good faith. Firstly, Art. 7(1) CISG only requires the obser-
vance of good faith with regard to trade. It has been noted above, that the application of good 
faith in domestic law can lead to different standards depending on whether or not there is a 
typical imbalance between the contracting parties.220 Consequently, there is a tendency to let 
the strict law or terms of the contract prevail to a greater extent if both parties are experi-
enced in trade and it can be assumed that they negotiate at arm's length. Secondly, good 
faith is only relevant as far as it is considered internationally accepted.221 Hence, it is not 
permissible to refer to domestic notions of good faith, even if there is a common understand-
ing about good faith within the domestic legal systems of both contractual parties.222 
 
II. The Legislative History of Art. 7 (1) CISG 
The wording of Art. 7(1) CISG appears unfamiliar to lawyers from any domestic jurisdiction 
as good faith is normally not used as an interpretative device for a legal text.223 Neither ULIS 
nor ULF, as predecessors to the CISG, contained a general principle of good faith.224 The 
final version of Art. 7(1) CISG is a compromise between the diverging concepts of the dele-
gates from common law and from civil law jurisdictions with regard to a general principle of 
good faith. 
 
During the preparation of the CISG, the introduction of good faith was first proposed by the 
representative of Spain in 1972, but was apparently not further pursued.225 In 1978 the Hun-
                                                
219 See section II below. 
220 See Chapter 1, D, III, 2 above. 
221 Enderlein/Maskow, Art. 7, sec. 6. 
222 The compliance in both domestic systems can, however, become relevant once the court or tribunal decided 
to take resort to private international law under Art. 7(2), second alternative, CISG. 
223 Eörsi, § 2.03, p. 2-6. 
224 An explicit reference to a general principle of good faith was proposed during the preparation of the 1964 
Hague Conventions but eventually rejected as it was believed that it would lead to divergent and arbitrary in-
terpretations by national courts, and thus would impair uniformity, cf. Garro, 23 International Lawyer [1989], 
p. 443 ff., sec. II, B, 4 with further references in fn. 101. Despite the legislative history of Art. 17 ULIS, it was 
argued that good faith, in fact, was a general principle of ULIS, that could be deduced from numerous specific 
provisions implementing a standard of 'reasonableness', cf. Mertens/Rehbinder, Art. 17 EKG, sec. 22 with fur-
ther references to German scholarly writing; Schlechtriem/Herber, Commentary, Art. 7, sec. 34 in fn. 54 with 
reference to a decision of the German Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf. Note, however, that non-civil law com-
mentaries did not refer to a general principle of good faith, cf. e.g. Graveson/Cohn, p. 61 - 63. 
225 Eörsi, § 2.03, p. 2-6; 3 UNCITRAL Yearbook 76 no. 52 [1972]. 
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garian representative introduced good faith within the context contract formation, and pro-
posed a formulation according to which 'in the course of the formation of the contract the 
parties must observe the principles of fair dealing and act in good faith.'226 The introduction of 
good faith in the context of contract formation was considered unfortunate as it triggered im-
mediate opposition from common law representatives. They stressed that the common law 
draws a distinct line between the phase of the negotiation and the actual conclusion of a con-
tract.227 Hence, the common law representatives wanted to avoid any notion of culpa in con-
trahendo, which, in common law systems,228 is seen as a manifestation of good faith. The 
opposition to a general principle of good faith was, however, not restricted to concerns about 
the pre-contractual phase, but was also based on more general arguments. In particular, it 
was feared that a general principle of good faith: was 'vague and unnecessary', that its speci-
fication lacked a legal framework as it can be found in domestic systems of law, and that the 
variety of forums applying the CISG would make a uniform interpretation of good faith impos-
sible.229 Other objectors argued that good faith was adequately dealt with under domestic 
law, and that the proposal lacked substance as it failed to provide remedies for the breach of 
an obligation to act in good faith.230 
 
The final version of Art. 7(1) CISG was adopted as a compromise between these two posi-
tions. Due to great uncertainty regarding the meaning of good faith within the final provisions, 
which dealt with the interpretation of the CISG, the wording of Art. 7(1) CISG was called un-
fortunate,231 and good faith as a general principle of the CISG was considered 'buried'.232 
 
The wording of Art. 6 of the 1978 draft of the CISG, which became Art. 7 of the final version, 
was the following: 
                                                
226 Garro, 23 International Lawyer (1989), p. 443 ff., sec. II, B, 4 in fn. 102; UNCITRAL Yearbook 61 no. 66 
[1978]. 
227 Garro, 23 International Lawyer (1989), p. 443 ff., sec. II, B, 4 with further references in fn. 103; Farnsworth, 3 
Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 47 at 57 f. 
228 Eiselen, 116 SALJ [1999] 333 at 358; Farnsworth, 3 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 47 at 58. It is thought that this 
association between good faith and culpa in contrahendo, a doctrine of fault in negotiations that was devel-
oped in German law, but based on an analogy with specific provisions of the German BGB, can be attributed 
to the article by F Kessler and E Fine, Culpa in contrahendo, Bargaining in good faith: A comparative study, 
77 Harvard Law Review [1964] 401, cf. Zimmermann/Whittaker, p. 27 in fn. 115. 
229 Garro, 23 International Lawyer (1989), p. 443 ff., sec. II, B, 4 with further references in fn. 103. 
230 Cf. e.g. Klein, 15 Liverpool Law Review 115 at 121. 
231 Comments referred to 'uneasy', 'strange' and, ironically, 'statesmanlike', cf. Garro, 23 International Lawyer 
(1989), p. 443 ff., sec. II, B, 4 with further references. Cf. furthermore 'awkward compromise', and 'a rather pe-
culiar provision' as cited by Farnsworth, 3 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 47 at 55 with further references; Bridge, sec. 
2.32 'The application of this provision is something of a mystery.' 
232 Garro, 23 International Lawyer (1989), p. 443 ff., sec. II, B, 4. 
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In the interpretation and application of this Convention regard is to be had to its in-
ternational character and to the need to promote uniformity and the observance of 
good faith in international trade. [emphasis added] 
The text of the UNCITRAL Secretariat Commentary refers to Art. 6 of the 1978 draft and not 
to Art. 7(1) of the final version. Thus, the text of the Commentary states that 
'[T]he principle of good faith is, however, broader than these examples and applies 
to all aspects of the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Conven-
tion.'233 [emphasis added] 
It has been argued that this particular change in the final version of the CISG is a mere edito-
rial matter and that the change, thus, cannot serve in order to restrict the scope of the appli-
cation of the principle of good faith in the CISG.234 
 
III. Objective-Normative Standards in Specific CISG Provisions 
The CISG contains a number of provisions that impose an objective standard of behaviour 
on the parties to the sales contract with regard to the performance of contractual obligations. 
The most common standard is the one of 'reasonableness',235 however objective standards 
are also imposed by the terms 'normal',236 or 'ought to have'.237 Furthermore, the second sen-
tence of Art. 29(2) CISG provides for a specific case of promissory estoppel, or venire contra 
factum proprium, as it protects the reliance of one party on the conduct of the other party, 
even if the conduct is contrary to the express terms of the contract.238 All these objective 
standards are considered 'normative' as they do not refer to what the parties did or intended, 
but what the law sees as the appropriate conduct. These objective-normative standards are 
seen as specific manifestations of the requirement of the observance of good faith.239 This 
view appears to be undisputed.240 The contentious question is, however, which role the spe-
                                                
233 Cf. UNCITRAL, Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Text of 
Secretariat Commentary on article 6 of the 1978 Draft, sec. 4. 
234 Schlechtriem/Herber, Commentary, Art. 7, sec. 16 and Schlechtriem/Junge, Commentary, Art. 8, sec. 9. 
235 Cf. Keily, 3 VJ 15 at 29 in fn. 70 and DiMatteo et al., 24 NW. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 299 at 317 f. fn. 74 with a com-
prehensive list of CISG provisions using the term 'reasonable' or its derivatives. The authors counted 38 in-
stances of 'reasonableness' in the CISG. 
236 Article 21(2) CISG 'if the transmission had been normal'; Art. 82(2), (c) CISG 'normal course of business' and 
'course of normal use'. 
237 Article 39(1), Art. 49(2), (b), (i), Art. 64(2), (b), (i) CISG. 
238 Cf. Eiselen, 14 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 379 at 383; Magnus, 59 RabelsZ 469 at 480 f.; cf. Klein, Liverpool Law Re-
view 115 at 129: 'While the words "good faith" are nowhere to be found in Art. 29, it is clear that the outcome 
in this scenario is grounded largely on the good faith obligation, for there is nothing [...] that would otherwise 
preclude the avoidance of the agreement as modified.' 
239 Cf. UNCITRAL, Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, the 
Secretariat Commentary on article 6 of the 1978 Draft, sec. 4. 
240 With the exception of Sim, sec. III, B, 2, c, (i), who, however, seems to be misled by the assumption that the 
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cific manifestations of good faith can play in the determination of a general principle of good 
faith under the CISG.241 
 
B. Article 7 CISG and the General Principle of Good Faith 
It will be seen that the general principle of good faith was, contrary to the judgements made 
after the acceptance of the final version of the CISG, not buried. However, due to the legisla-
tive history of Art. 7(1) CISG, and the compromise resulting from the different interests, 'al-
most everybody disagrees as to the impact, if any, that the principle of good faith may have 
on the behaviour the parties to an international contract for the sale of goods'.242  
 
There are five views of the role good faith can play as a general principle within Art. 7 CISG: 
Art. 7(1) CISG can be read literally, and good faith would, thus, only be relevant for the adju-
dicator to interpret the convention;243 Article 7(1) CISG could be interpreted beyond its word-
ing and be understood as imposing a positive duty to act in good faith on the parties to the 
sales contract.244 Furthermore, a duty of the contractual parties to act in good faith could be 
denied under Art. 7(1) CISG, but be seen as a general principle of the CISG according to 
Art. 7(2) CISG.245 It is also argued that, beyond 'interpretation' in Art. 7(1) CISG, good faith is 
not covered by the CISG and, thus, domestic law has to be applied.246 Finally, it is asserted 
that a general principle of good faith under the CISG should be interpreted in light of the 
UNIDROIT Principles and the lex mercatoria.247 
 
I. Article 7(1) CISG as an Exclusively Interpretative Rule 
The most restricted understanding of good faith in the CISG is the one which limits the scope 
of good faith to the interpretation of the provisions of the CISG. This means that there is no 
                                                
standard of reasonableness in the specific provisions is equated or used synonymously with good faith, 
whereas the correct understanding is that these provisions are only a manifestation of particular situations 
where good faith has to be observed. It is admitted, and this seems to be Sim's main concern, that with the 
acknowledgement of specific rules of good faith nothing is said about their influence on a general principle of 
good faith. 
241 See in detail section B, III below. 
242 Garro, 23 International Lawyer, p. 443 ff., sec. II, B, 4. 
243 See section I below. 
244 See section II below. 
245 See section III below. 
246 See section IV below. 
247 See section V below. 
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general duty imposed on the parties to the contract of sale to act in good faith.248 A duty of 
good faith would only be imposed on the judges and arbitrators applying the CISG. The sup-
porter of this understanding of Art. 7(1) CISG have the advantage of the unequivocal wording 
on their side. In addition, the legislative history of Art. 7(1) CISG is also relied on,249 though 
sometimes only as a supportive argument.250 
 
It has, furthermore, been submitted that the word 'promote' in Art. 7(1) CISG refers exclu-
sively to the requirement of uniformity and not to the observance of good faith.251 Hence, 
according to this understanding, no preferential treatment of good faith in the interpretation is 
required, and uniformity would be the more important task to achieve.252 
 
II. Article 7(1) CISG as an Obligation to Act in Good Faith 
It has been noted above that the wording of Art. 7(1) CISG raises questions. On the one 
hand, it is unusual that the law expressly imposes a duty to act in good faith on judges and 
arbitrators. One would assume that adjudicators have an inherent duty to act impartially and 
according to the legal framework provided by the CISG. Hence, where discretion or space for 
interpretation exists, they must give consideration to the interests of both contract parties. 
Thus it seems, in fact, 'strange', 'awkward' and 'peculiar' to impose a duty to observe good 
faith on the judiciary, and not on the parties. 
 
On the other hand, it is doubted that a distinct line can be drawn between the interpretation 
of the CISG's provisions, and the interpretation of the terms of the sales contract, as the for-
mer necessarily influences the latter.253 Hence, it was concluded that, despite its wording, 
                                                
248 For such a restrictive role of good faith e.g. Farnsworth, 3 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 47 at 57 f.; Felemegas, 
p. 243 f.; Klein, 15 Liverpool Law Review 115 at 120; Sim, sec. III, B, 2, d. 
249 It does not lack a certain irony that common law lawyers use the intention of the legislator, an interpretative 
technique they normally encounter with suspicion as they consider it a civil law invention, in order to reject a 
the civil law doctrine of good faith, whereas civil lawyer neglect the intention of the legislator against their habit 
in order to promote 'their' doctrine of good faith. 
250 Farnsworth, 3 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 47 at 56: '[A]s one of the delegates who opposed any reference to good 
faith, it strikes me as a perversion of the compromise to let a general principle of good faith in by the back 
door.' This statement has been answered with equally strong language calling it 'a lonely cry amidst a sea of 
support to the contrary', cf. Keily, 3 VJ 15 at 29. 
251 Cf. Keily, 3 VJ 15 at 23 in fn. 43; Powers, 18 J. L. & Com. 333 at 344. 
252 See however UNCITRAL, Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, the Secretariat' Commentary on article 6 of the 1978 Draft, sec. 2 (article 7 of the final version), which 
states that the observance of good faith must be promoted, and, thus, seems to take the broader view on the 
wording. 
253 Cf. e.g. Eörsi, § 2.03, p. 2-8: '[T]hus, interpretation of the Convention may indeed lead to application of the 
good faith clause. It might be argued that in such case it was not the Convention which was interpreted but the 
contract. In my humble opinion, however, interpretation of the two cannot separated since the Convention is 
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good faith in Art. 7(1) CISG cannot be confined to the interpretation of the CISG's express 
rules but that it also imposes a general obligation on the contractual parties to perform their 
obligations in good faith.254  
 
III. Good Faith as a General Principle under Art. 7(2) CISG 
Another way to extend the scope of good faith beyond a merely interpretative function is to 
recognise good faith as a general principle underlying the Convention according to Art. 7(2) 
CISG. Such a principle could be deduced from the provisions which impose objective-
normative standards on the behaviour of the parties.255 This method has the advantage that 
the wording of Art. 7(1) CISG does not have to be overcome, as restricting Art. 7(1) CISG to 
the interpretation of the Convention does not necessarily exclude the existence of a more far-
reaching principle of good faith that underlies the CISG. However, considering the legislative 
history of Art. 7(1) CISG the recognition of a general principle to act in good faith would, in 
effect, be a circumvention of the reached compromise. This would amount to an ignorance of 
the legislative history similar to extension of the scope of Art. 7(1) CISG beyond its wording. 
It can be argued that Art. 7(2) CISG only allows the application of principles that are not ex-
pressly settled in the Convention, and that good faith finds its expressed and restricted set-
tlement in Art. 7(1) CISG. Thus, according to this argument, there would be no space for a 
more extensive general principle with regard to good faith.256 
 
The supporters of a general principle of good faith under Art. 7(2) CISG argue that, as the 
wording of Art. 7(1) CISG is restricted to 'interpretation of the Convention', other functions of 
good faith are not expressly settled in the Convention and that there is, consequently, a pos-
                                                
necessarily interpreted by the parties also; after all the Convention constitutes the law of the parties insofar as 
they do not make use of Article 6 on freedom of contract.'' 
254 Eörsi, § 2.03, p. 2-8; Schlechtriem/Herber, Commentary, Art. 7, sec. 16; Magnus, 10 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 89 at 
90: '[T]he CISG, however does not contain an express provision providing that individual contracts must obey 
the maxim of good faith. It is common ground that under the CISG the good faith principle, in addition to the 
parties' contractual relationship, applies to the interpretation of the individual contract.' Also: Rosett, 45 Ohio 
State Law Journal 265 at 289; cf. furthermore Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in International 
Uniform Laws, p. 3, who rather deduces a more far-reaching scope of good faith from Art. 7(2) CISG but refers 
in fn. 2 to the fact that almost the entire German commentary literature on the CISG extends the scope of 
Art. 7(1) CISG in a way similar to § 242 BGB (cf. references to the commentaries on the CISG of von Caem-
merer/Schlechtriem/Herber, Staudinger/Magnus, Honsell/Melis, and Karolus). 
255 Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws, p. 3; Zeller, Chapter 4, sec. 4, b; 
Keily, 3 VJ 15 at 29; apparently also Klein, 15 Liverpool Law Review 115 at 141.  
256 Cf. Felemegas, p. 198: 'What is less, if all, legitimate is the subsequent catapulting of the concept of good faith 
as a "general principle" under Art. 7(2) into the interpretative mechanism of the CISG under Art. 7(1).' 
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sibility for the application of a general principle.257 Such a tacit general principle would stand 
alongside with the expressed interpretative notion of good faith under Art. 7(1) CISG. 
 
IV. Good Faith as a Matter to be Resolved by Domestic Law 
It is argued that it is not possible to deduce a general principle of good faith underlying the 
CISG, and that, since the matter is not resolved by the CISG, the answer has to be found in 
domestic law.258 However, it has been shown in Chapter 1 that a good faith is usually used 
as an exception when the application of a strict rule is thought to be inappropriate.259 To re-
sort to domestic law would mean that the rule is located in the CISG but the exception to the 
rule, good faith, would be determined under domestic law. As an example: Article 75 CISG 
requires a party to give notice of avoidance of the contract to the other party, in order to claim 
damages caused by a substitute transaction. The question of, whether or not a party is ex-
empted from the obligation to notify, is not regulated in the CISG and would, consequently, 
have to be determined according to the good faith rules of domestic law.260 This cannot be 
the understanding of 'matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in 
it', as stipulated in Art. 7(2) CISG. Otherwise, it would be possible to circumvent any of the 
provisions of the uniform law with exceptions found in domestic law. This, however, would 
undermine the primary objectives of the CISG - the international character, uniformity and 
predictability - more than a general principle of good faith under the CISG would.261 Hence, 
the only acceptable interpretation is that if the exception of a rule cannot be found in the 
CISG, then there is no exception at all.  
 
V. The Influence of UNIDROIT Principles and the lex mercatoria  
The four suggestions examined above of how to apply a general principle of good faith under 
Art. 7 CISG have difficulty determining what good faith is and to what extent it is applicable. 
                                                
257 Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws, p. 3; Schlechtriem, Uniform 
Sales Law, p. 39. 
258 Sim, sec. III, B, 2, c, ii; the possibility is also mentioned, but not supported, by Farnsworth, 3 Tul. J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 47 at 56. 
259 See Chapter 1, sec. D, III, 1 above. 
260 See for this question the decision of Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, 28 February 1997, 1 U 167/95, Chapter 3, 
D, II, 1 below, where good faith under the CISG, and not domestic law, was applied. 
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principle of good faith may mean that decision-makers would have to turn to the rules of private international 
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principle of good faith.' 
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Even those writers who support a literal and, in their view, narrow understanding of good 
faith,262 cannot deduce from Art. 7(1) CISG how an interpretation of the Convention has to be 
conducted.263 This conclusion leads some writers to look for a 'concretisation' of good faith 
outside the CISG, particularly in the UNIDROIT Principles and accepted rules of the lex mer-
catoria.264 It is argued that the good faith provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles, which are 
far more detailed than those of the CISG, can, to a certain extent, be equated with the un-
derstanding of good faith in the CISG.265 The supporters of this view admit that  two dogmatic 
obstacles exist: the fact that the UNIDROIT Principles drafted after the adoption of the CISG, 
and that the wording of Art. 7(2) CISG refers to general principles 'on which it [the CISG] is 
based'. However, considering that the CISG provides no mechanisms or authorities to de-
velop the Convention,266 the advantages of the UNIDROIT Principles are seen to prevail over 
the technical obstacles in the reasoning.267 Recognising that Art. 7(2) CISG makes the CISG 
a closed system, which is not open for the import of legal doctrine from the outside, some 
writers require that there must be a manifestation of the idea in the CISG. Hence, only a ref-
erence to the UNIDROIT Principles or rules of the lex mercatoria can only be used to specify 
this idea.268 
 
                                                
262 It will be seen below that the interpretation of the CISG by a judge under 'the observance of good faith' might 
lead to a more extensive role of good faith than the mere interpretation of the contractual terms, see section 
VI, 2 below. 
263 Cf. e.g. Sim, sec. III, B, 2, d. 
264 See for an analysis and compilation of the lex mercatoria as applied by international arbitral tribunals Mustill, 4 
Arbitration International 86 ff. 
265 The strongest statement is made by Magnus, 10 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 89 at 95, stating that '[T]he differences 
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ICC Publication No. 440/9, 1999, p. 157 at 166 ff.; more generally Garro, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 1149 at 1189 '[T]he 
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UNIDROIT Principle because the Principles were adopted for the specific purpose of supplementing interna-
tional instruments such as the CISG, thus complementing the terms of contracts and the usages of trade that 
govern international sales transactions.'; equally vague but particularly in the context of good faith Powers, 18 
J. L. & Com. 333 at 349: '[H]owever, the UNIDROIT Principles are meant to be a culmination of international 
contract law and should assist one in interpreting the CISG. [...] The good faith provision of the European 
Principles are very similar to those in the UNIDROIT Principles. Taken together, these two documents 
strengthen the argument that good faith is an internationally recognized principle that should be found to be a 
requirement of the CISG.' 
266 Cf. for this argument particularly Keily, 3 VJ 15 at 33. 
267 Magnus, 10 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 89 at 95; Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles as a Means of Interpreting and Sup-
plementing International Uniform Law, p. 30; Garro, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 1149 at 1189. 
268 Magnus, Editorial Remarks, sec. 2, b; Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles as a Means of Interpreting and Sup-
plementing International Uniform Law, p. 33. 
39 
VI. Analysis and Discussion 
1. Interpreting Art. 7(1) CISG 
The question or whether or not the application of 'good faith' in Art. 7(1) CISG is restricted to 
the wording, is a matter of interpretation. However, uncertainty exists regarding the interpre-
tation of the CISG. Although Art. 7 CISG is the norm that should stipulate rules for the inter-
pretation (para 1) and the gap-filling (para 2), only very vague and abstract guidelines are 
given. The extent to which methods, such as textual, systematic, historical and teleological 
interpretation, are applicable, is left open. 
 
Relative unity exists about the fact that when interpreting a term within the Convention it is 
not appropriate to import a certain understanding of a term from a domestic system of law. 
The obligation provided by Art. 7(1) CISG to interpret the Convention with regard to its inter-
national character requires an autonomous determination of the content and scope of good 
faith. Thus, no resort can be taken to doctrines of good faith developed in a certain domestic 
jurisdiction.269 However, the CISG does not provide guidance for how to interpret a term in 
the Convention autonomously.270 Although much has been written about the gap-filling proc-
ess under Art. 7 CISG, it appears that there is still great uncertainty of how to exercise more 
basic tasks of interpretation. It is, for example, the prevailing view that, other than under the 
common law tradition, the traveaux préparatoires can play a certain role in the interpretation 
of ambiguous provisions.271 However, there is no consensus how the legislative history has 
to be weighed in relation to other methods of interpretation,272 especially the wording and the 
teleological273 interpretation. 
 
These questions do not have to be answered definitively and conclusively, as there is a 
common understanding that the wording of a provision is the starting point, and that, if the 
wording is sufficiently clear an interpretation is neither necessary, nor permissible.274 With 
regard to the clear and unambiguous wording of Art. 7(1), CISG in conjunction with its legis-
                                                
269 Cf. e.g. Magnus, Editorial Remarks, sec. 2, a. 
270 Schlechtriem/Herber, Commentary, Art. 7, sec. 19. 
271 Schlechtriem/Herber, Commentary, Art. 7, sec. 20; Felemegas, p. 260 with further references to the traditional 
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274 Schlechtriem/Herber, Commentary, Art. 7, sec. 20. 
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lative history, it is not possible to extend the scope of good faith beyond the task of interpret-
ing the Convention and impose an obligation to act in good faith on the contract parties. 
 
2. The General Principle under Art. 7(2) CISG 
(a) Deducing an Underlying Principle 
In order to accept good faith as a general principle under Art. 7(2) CISG it must be shown 
that an obligation for the contract parties to act in good faith is reflected in the CISG. A gen-
eral principle is usually determined by deducing it from specific provisions in the CISG,275 
which must contain an idea which allows for generalization. Scholarly writers have defined a 
number of general principles which are in some domestic legal systems part of good faith, 
such as venire contra factum proprium; waiver; a general duty to co-operate to secure con-
tract performance, and a general duty to inform the other party.276 Some writers believe that 
beyond or above these specific doctrines there exists a general principle of good faith under 
Art. 7(2) CISG. Even those writers have, however, to admit that it is difficult to determine the 
scope and content of such a principle.277 This does not come as a surprise, as good faith 
cannot be deduced from specific provisions of the CISG as long as there is no consensus of 
what good faith is. It appears that Art. 7(2) CISG, and a general principle of good faith share 
a common feature: both legal devices do not provide a substantive solution for specific prob-
lems, but are only methods to find such solutions. Once such a solution is found in a specific 
doctrine, to resort to a general principle of good faith would be redundant. 
 
(b) The CISG as a Closed System 
Article 7(2) CISG implements a closed system, which means that either a general principle 
can be found within the CISG, or the problem will have to be solved under domestic law. The 
only 'gates' through which rules from outside the CISG can find their way into the CISG is via 
trade usages, which were either established between the parties (Art. 8(3), 9(1) CISG), or 
which are being observed regularly in the trade (Art. 9(1) CISG). Hence, if the solution is nei-
ther found in the CISG nor in trade usage, it is not permissible to revert to rules outside the 
CISG, however reasonable they may be. Thus, if the solutions provided by the UNIDROIT 
Principles or the lex mercatoria do not comply with the principles of the CISG, they cannot be 
applied, however, if they do comply the reference to such solutions would be redundant. As it 
                                                
275 Ferrari 53 JZ 9 at 12. 
276 Magnus, 59 RabelsZ 469 at 481 f.; Schlechtriem/Herber, Commentary, Art. 7, sec. 17; Ferrari 53 JZ 9 at 12. 
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can be seen from the legislative history of Art. 7 CISG, the draftsmen of the Convention 
could not agree to assign good faith a role as extensive as in Art. 1.7, 1.8 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles. Consequently, the required compliance is not met and the UNIDROIT provisions 
cannot help specifying good faith within the CISG as they are based on an entirely different 
concept of good faith. The question that remains unanswered is, whether a general principle 
of good faith can be used as another 'gateway' to import external ideas into the CISG.278 
 
3. The Scope and the Content of Good Faith in Art. 7(1) CISG 
It can be concluded from the above that good faith as a general principle in the CISG is re-
stricted to the interpretation of the Convention according to Art. 7(1) CISG. Therefore, the 
scope of application of good faith under Art. 7(1) CISG remains to be determined. It will be 
seen that good faith is more than a reference to morality,279 the rule of pacta sunt servanda is 
not part of good faith,280 and good faith and fair dealing must be understood as an objective-
normative concept.281 It will, however, become clear that a coherent substantive concept of 
good faith cannot be deduced, but that good faith must be understood functionally, i.e. as a 
methodological instrument.282 
 
(a) The Legal vs Moral Concept 
The CISG uses the reference to good faith in Art. 7(1) not merely in a moral, ethical or phi-
losophical meaning.283 The crucial argument is not that there is no common denominator of 
morality across the different nations and society,284 but that an understanding of good faith, 
as a mere moral concept, does not add anything to a codification of rules. It has, correctly, 
been observed that rules of good faith are not more, or more equitable, or more moral than 
other rules.285 The fact that a rule of law cannot be directly traced back to good faith does not 
mean that its content is not a manifestation of moral values or standards. One can go so far 
                                                
277 Magnus, 59 RabelsZ 469 at 481 f. 
278 See section C, III below. 
279 See section (a) below. 
280 See section (b) below. 
281 See section (c) below. 
282 See section (d) below. 
283 Cf. e.g. Zeller, Chapter 4, sec. 4, c with reference to the discussions during the drafting process of the CISG. 
For the contrary view cf. Sim, sec. IV, B, 2, c, i, discussing a general principle of good faith under Art. 7(2) 
CISG. 
284 Cf. for this argument however Zeller, Chapter 4, sec. 4, c. 
285 Hesselink, The Concept of Good Faith, p. 492 f. 
42 
as to see the principles of party autonomy and of pacta sunt servanda, which stipulates in 
essence that 'one must keep one's word', as a manifestation of a moral rule. Hence, it is put 
forward that the assertion that good faith is a moral standard, or opens a gateway for moral-
ity, does not lead to any helpful insights into the scope and content of good faith in the CISG. 
Consequently, the argument of morality can be neglected for the purpose of the following 
analysis. 
 
(b) The Role of pacta sunt servanda 
Some writers maintain the view that the principle of pacta sunt servanda constitutes a part of 
good faith in the CISG.286 This view, that seems to derive from the understanding of bona 
fides in Roman law, is not appropriate for the CISG. The rule that contracts are binding is 
one of the principles which underlie the Convention according to Art. 7(2) CISG. In the event 
that the CISG made no reference to good faith, pacta sunt servanda would still apply. This 
can be seen from the many provisions which require the binding nature of the contract.287 
 
(c) Objective-Normative vs Subjective-Descriptive Understanding 
It has been noted above,288 that good faith, when referred to as a general principle, doctrine, 
or concept, is used in an objective-normative sense.289 This means that the good faith does 
not refer to the subjective state of mind of the contractual parties, but instead inquires as to 
what the parties ought to have done. Hence, the understanding of good faith as 'honesty in 
fact', as it is used in various common law legislation,290 does not apply to the CISG.291 The 
view that good faith in the CISG is to be understood descriptively instead of normatively, and 
merely seeks to describe good faith as it is currently used in international trade, must be re-
jected.292 Article 7(1) CISG addresses the interpreting judge or arbitrator and not the contract 
parties. The interpretation of a norm is, however, not a factual, but a normative process. The 
contrary view confuses trade usage with good faith. It is admitted that the adjudicator might 
                                                
286 Klein, 15 Liverpool Law Review 115 at 116. 
287 See as only one example amongst many Magnus, 59 RabelsZ 469 at 480, referring to the exceptions from 
pacta sunt servanda contained in Art. 71-73, 79 CISG as indication that an implied rule must exist. 
288 Chapter 1, section D. 
289 Cf. UNCITRAL; Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Text of 
Secretariat Commentary on article 6 of the 1978 Draft, sec. 3 which refers to the specific provision of the CISG 
that impose objective normative standards and describes them as 'applications of good faith'. 
290 See for example section 61(3) of the English Sale of Goods Act 1979, and section 1-201(19) UCC, which 
defines good faith as '[h]onesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned'. 
291 Zeller, Chapter 4, sec. 3. 
292 So however Felemegas, p. 246. 
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have to consider trade practice by the parties. These cases are, however, expressly ad-
dressed in Art. 8(3), 9 CISG. Good faith, as a legal term, however, is not determined by the 
action of trading but by the adjudication of disputes that arise out of trade transactions.293 
 
(d) Functional Method vs Coherent Substantive Principle 
It has been stated above that it can be deduced neither form the wording of Art. 7(1) CISG, 
nor from the traveaux préparatoires what the requirement of 'interpretation with regard to the 
observance of good faith' means. Furthermore, an interpretation with regard to the object and 
purpose of the norm is difficult to achieve, since, due to last minute compromise, no docu-
mented intention of the legislator exists. This means that in essence it is not clear whether 
good faith in Art. 7(1) CISG is thought to fulfil one of the three functions identified for good 
faith in the domestic jurisdictions of the civil law tradition, i.e. (i) the interpretative function; (ii) 
the supplementary function; and (iii) the corrective (derogating / restrictive) function.294 
 
The supporters of the position taken by the common law representatives seem to assume 
that the reached compromise, restricted the function of good faith to an absolute minimum. 
Firstly, good faith has a merely interpretative function, serving to close gaps which were to 
small for the legislator to regula, or where the wording is ambiguous and allows two different 
meanings.295 Secondly, this function is also restricted to the rules of the CISG and cannot be 
extended to the terms of the sales contract. This restrictive understanding does not follow 
from the wording of Art. 7(1) CISG, and the traveaux préparatoires only allow for the conclu-
sion that good faith should not be used in order to impose direct contractual duties on the 
parties to the contract. An interpretation of one or more provisions of the CISG can, however, 
comprise, not only minor matters, but also the derogation from a rule, or the restriction of the 
application of a rule granting one party certain rights.296 This clearly amounts to the corrective 
function of good faith, which is generally considered to interfere with the legislative intentions 
the most.297 
 
                                                
293 To avoid confusion about the normative character of good faith, Art. 1.7 UNIDROIT Principles refers to 'fair 
dealing' making it clear that an objective standard is required, cf. Zeller, Chapter 4, section 2, b. 
294 See Chapter 1, D above. 
295 Cf. e.g. Sim, sec. III, B, 2, c, ii: '[I]t is submitted that the most natural and ordinary meaning of "interpret" 
should be adopted i.e. "to explain or tell the meaning of" or "to make understandable".'' 
296 Sim, sec. III, B, 2, c, ii disapprovingly citing Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales, sec. 101. 
297 See Chapter 1, B, I, 4 above. 
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It is argued that the function which good faith assumes in the CISG, cannot be deduced from 
the wording of Art. 7(1) CISG. Although everyone seems to agree that the CISG has to be 
interpreted autonomously, the use of terms in the Convention which are known from a do-
mestic context raise the question of how much of the domestic preconception found its way 
into the CISG. It seems that most of the writers use a domestic preconception of good faith, 
at least as a starting point in their argumentation, a fact that certainly influences the result of 
their analysis. Hence, the same problems and questions about the role, function, and scope 
of good faith that have been discussed in Chapter 1 above, reappear on the level of interna-
tional uniform law. 
 
It has been show in Chapter 1 that the legal systems, which have developed a general prin-
ciple of good faith use the principle in order to provide the judiciary with the necessary flexi-
bility to solve the conflict between strict law and justice (fairness, equity) within a codified set 
of rules. For this reason good faith was suggested to be included in the CISG. For the same 
reason representatives from jurisdictions less familiar with the principle, and in favour of a 
more rigid application of the principle of party autonomy, objected against the introduction of 
good faith into the CISG. Thus, the common law - civil law divide with regard to good faith 
was with the compromise found in Art. 7(1) CISG, imported into the CISG. Although the 
CISG must be interpreted autonomously, and without imposing national solutions on the in-
ternational uniform law, it is submitted that the understanding of good faith is not a com-
pletely new one, but that it is based on the historical development in domestic law, as exam-
ined in Chapter 1 above. Preconceptions about good faith in domestic law lead to 
misunderstandings in the academic debate regarding good faith. Consequently, the search 
for a coherent substantive core of good faith is given up in frustration, and often results in the 
conclusion that good faith does not play a decisive role in the CISG as its scope and content 
cannot be deduced.298 
 
Hence, it should be remembered that the legal systems which used good faith extensively 
and developed it into a rather sophisticated body of rules, such as Germany, found three 
basic, cumulative prerequisites that lead them to resort to good faith: (i) courts had to apply a 
code that had either 'birth defects', or the provisions of the code were no longer appropriate 
as circumstances changed after the promulgation; (ii) the legislator was not willing or able to 
correct the resulting injustice; (iii) the courts needed a norm that could build an 'anchor' in the 
code as the ex lege development and application of rules parallel to the code was not permit-
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ted. It is this factual set up that made good faith a welcomed means to fulfil the three func-
tions that can be deduced from the existing doctrines that emerged under good faith: (i) in-
terpretation, (ii) supplementation, and (iii) correction (restriction/derogation) of legislative pro-
visions as well as contractual terms. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten, that these three 
functions of good faith, when applied, usually serve in order to perpetuate the contractual 
relation, as good faith leads rather to a change of the content of the contract than to a repu-
diation. This complies with the so called favor contractus principle, which is said to form a 
general principle of the CISG under Art. 7(2) CISG.299 
 
It has also been shown in Chapter 1 above that judicial practice normally uses good faith 
only as a last resort. If flexibility in order to achieve just results is provided by other, more 
specific means, those means are typically preferred to the use of good faith. Hence, the ex-
tent to which the CISG provides other means to enable courts and tribunals to react with the 
necessary flexibility to changing circumstances and to achieve just (equitable, fair) results 
despite the strict letters of the law or the contract, must be examined. Provided these goals 
can be achieved by more specific means, there is no need for an, admittedly, open principle 
of good faith. Hence, good faith in the CISG is subsidiary. Where such means do not exist, it 
has to be discussed whether or not the CISG allows good faith to take over this function. It is 
admitted that this method is not free from preconceptions of good faith as known in domestic 
law. However, it appears that the drafters of the CISG were not free from such a preconcep-
tion, as they did not opt to use a term without the burden of a domestic preconception. 
 
C. Other Means to Fulfil the Functions of Good Faith 
I. Interpretative Function 
The only function of good faith in the CISG that is not contentious is the interpretation of am-
biguous terms of provisions of the Convention. However, even in this respect, good faith is 
subsidiary and only plays a role when the accepted methods of interpretation do not lead to a 
clear result. 
 
The question remains whether good faith can play a role in the interpretation of the contract 
provisions, as Art. 7(1) CISG is not applicable to the obligations of the parties. Article 8 
CISG, which contains the provisions for the interpretation of the contract does not refer to 
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good faith.300 Furthermore, it has been shown that Art. 7(1) CISG does not apply directly to 
the contract terms.301 However, it has been noted above that the CISG implements objective 
standards in a number of provisions which regulate the legal consequences of the behaviour 
of the parties. For this purpose 'open terms' such as 'reasonableness', are used more often 
than, for example, in the German civil code. The resort to a general principle of good faith is 
not necessary, wherever the CISG provides for such specific possibilities for courts and tri-
bunals to consider all circumstances of the particular case. 
 
II. Supplementary Function 
It has been seen in Chapter 1 above that in German law the supplementary function of good 
faith is used to impose contractual duties on the parties that were neither expressly agreed to 
nor implied.302 As the wording of Art. 7(1) CISG excludes the use of good faith in order to 
supplement contract terms, the question arises whether there are other possibilities for the 
adjudicator to close gaps in the contract. 
 
1. The Limited Scope of the CISG 
German law uses good faith to impose ancillary and supplementary duties on the parties. As 
with many doctrines which were developed under Treu und Glauben, the use of supplemen-
tary duties is in part caused by the weaknesses of the German law of delict.303 The CISG 
codifies the law of sales exclusively and within this area is restricted to certain types of trans-
actions.304 Hence, the CISG does not have to provide answers with regard to other areas of 
the law, but can leave problems to be solved under domestic law. This reduces the potential 
impact of the supplementary function of good faith in the CISG.305 
 
                                                
300 Other than e.g. § 157 BGB in German law, cf. Chapter 1, section B, I, 1 above. 
301 See section VI, 1 above. 
302 It is admitted that the gap-filling praeter legem (see section III, 1 below) also has a supplementing function, not 
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305 However, there remain areas of application. Supplementary duties derived from Treu und Glauben impose 
e.g. an obligation on the seller to deliver spare parts for a certain time after the termination of a long term 
sales agreement. If one follows the restrictive understanding of Art. 7(1) CISG, good faith cannot lead to such 
an result under the Convention, cf. ICC Court of Arbitration, W. v R., 23 January 1997, 8611/HV/JK (UNILEX), 
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2. Interpretation of Contract Terms under Art. 8 CISG 
It has been seen in Chapter 1 above that, on a domestic level, gaps in contracts are often 
filled by interpretation. In German law the method of supplementary interpretation (ergän-
zende Vertragsauslegung) under § 157 BGB and in English law, implied terms in fact and 
terms in law allow courts to impose contractual terms which the parties failed to include in 
their contract. The CISG regulates the interpretation of contract terms in Art. 8, a provision 
that does not refer to domestic methods of interpretation, but sets its own criteria. Article 8 
CISG contains a hierarchy that has to be observed in the interpretation of the contract:306 
first, the common intent of the parties makes an interpretation superfluous. Second, the in-
tent of one party has to be considered if the other party could have been aware of this intent 
(Art. 8(1)CISG). Third, the standard of a reasonable person has to be applied if the intent of 
one party could not have been known by the other party (Art. 8(2)CISG). Although Art. 8(2) is 
seen as a manifestation of good faith,307 as it establishes an objective-normative standard, 
the prevailing view is that it cannot be used in order to fill gaps in the contract, and imply 
terms which the parties did not reach consensus on.308 This view on Art. 8 CISG appears to 
rely on the fact that the object of the interpretation are the 'statements and conducts' of a 
party, and not the contract as a whole, as it is the case for example under § 157 BGB.309 Fur-
thermore, Art. 9 CISG, which deals with trade customs, is seen as the norm that has the 
function to supplement the contracts where the parties were silent.310 Hence, it must be con-
cluded that Art. 8 CISG cannot be used as a means to supplement the gaps in the contract 
left by the parties.311 
 
                                                
306 Eörsi, § 2.05, sec. 2-18. 
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instrument to supplement a contract that would otherwise have to be considered frustrated. 
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3. Trade Usage as Implied Contract Terms, Art. 8(3), 9 CISG 
Article 9(2) CISG provides that, unless otherwise agreed, trade usages form implied terms of 
the contract. This rule is considered to be a gap-filling provision.312 However, it requires an 
existing usage in the respective trade, that must regularly be observed within the trade. Thus, 
Art. 9(2) CISG makes reference to existing rules outside the contract, rules which have to be 
evaluated by the judge or the arbitrator on a factual basis. It has been stated, however, that 
good faith as it is understood in the CISG, is a normative principle in order to provide justice. 
Good faith is, thus, independent from the factual question of whether or not an actual rule 
already exists. The fact that a usage exists, and is widely used in a trade does not comment 
on the fairness of the usage as the usage has the quality of an ordinary contract term. That 
means that a trade usage itself can be a strict rule that may require supplementation or cor-
rection by normative standards, such as good faith. Consequently, Art. 9(2) CISG, although 
having a supplementary function with regard to the contract, cannot fulfil the task of correct-
ing the existing strict law or contract terms as it is attributed to the general principle of good 
faith. 
 
4. General Duty to Co-operate under Art. 7(2) CISG 
It has been argued by scholarly writers that a general duty of co-operation can be deduced 
from a number of specific provisions of the CISG, and that this duty forms a general principle 
of the Convention.313 This duty can lead to implied terms in a sales contract.314 It appears 
that a specific scope and content of such a duty has not yet evolved, and it is questionable 
whether the CISG provisions which were relied on can be generalised.315 Once a general 
duty to co-operate has been established,316 it could become a powerful device to supplement 
the parties' agreement, and would, thus, supersede the subsidiary principle of good faith. The 
guiding principle for a general duty to co-operate must be the principle of favor contractus: 
                                                
312 Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law, p. 39. 
313 Deduced from Art. 85, 86 (preservation of goods); Art. 34, 37, 48 (obligation to accept late delivery and re-
placements); and Art. 77 (mitigation of damages), cf. Magnus, 59 RabelsZ 469 at 484 with further references 
in fn. 59; Magnus, Editorial Remarks, section 2, b, ff.; Ferrari, 53 JZ [1998] 9 at 12 f. 
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usage under Art. 9 CISG but also cited Art. 7(2) CISG. As ICC awards are available in abstracts only, it cannot 
be determined whether tribunal relied on a duty to co-operate in addition to trade usage. Cf. in detail Chapter 
3, C, II, below. 
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only if the maintenance of the contractual purpose requires co-operation, can a duty to co-
operate be imposed on a party. As noted above, the limited scope of the CISG does not 
permit interference with the parties' agreement beyond the actual sales contract. For exam-
ple, the question of whether or not a seller is under the obligation to supply spare parts even 
after the actual contractual relationship has ended, could be answered positively with refer-
ence to a general duty to co-operate.317 
 
III. Corrective Function 
1. Gap-filling praeter legem 
(a) General Principles 
Article 7(2) CISG refers to general principles of the Convention for the purpose of gap-filling. 
Scholarly writers have identified general principles under Art. 7(2) CISG which are under 
domestic law seen as part of good faith: (i) the prohibition of inconsistent behaviour (deduced 
from Art. 16(2)(b), 29(2) CISG),318 (ii) the prohibition of the abuse of rights (deduced from 
Art. 29(2) CISG),319 and (iii) the rule that a party shall not take advantage of its own wrong 
(deduced from Art. 80 CISG).320. All three doctrines go beyond the wording of Art. 7(1) CISG 
as they directly intervene with the contractual obligations of the parties. 
 
Although it is argued that the three doctrines mentioned above are all derivatives of a general 
principle of good faith, they can under the CISG exist without the reference to good faith, as 
they can form independent general principles under Art. 7(2) CISG. It has been seen in 
Chapter 1 that the doctrines developed in German law under § 242 BGB have achieved the 
same degree of independence from a general principle of good faith but that the courts still 
need the general principle of good faith as an instrument to establish the doctrines within the 
system of the code. In the CISG, this function is exercised by Art. 7(2) CISG, which expressly 
permits the application of general principles in the absence of express rules. Hence, a reli-
ance on good faith under the CISG is not necessary if a general principle can be deduced 
                                                
317 Such an obligation is in German law based on good faith. ICC Court of Arbitration, W. v R., 23 January 1997, 
8611/HV/JK (UNILEX) denied the application of Art. 7(1) CISG and relied on trade usage (Art. 9 CISG). In ab-
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320 Enderlein/Maskow, Art. 7, sec. 9.1; Magnus, 59 RabelsZ [1995] 469 at 481. 
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from other CISG provisions. In this instance Art. 7(2) CISG takes over the role which the 
subsidiary principle of good faith plays in domestic jurisdictions. 
 
(b) Solutions Outside the CISG 
It must be noted, however, that specific good faith doctrines can only be deduced from the 
CISG itself, as Art. 7(2) CISG requires the general principle to be one of the Convention. If 
the matter is neither expressly nor tacitly settled by the Convention, a specific good faith doc-
trine cannot be imported from outside the CISG via Art. 7(2) CISG. It has been seen above 
that the CISG builds a 'closed system' and that, if a solution cannot be derived from the Con-
vention, the matter is referred by Art. 7(2) CISG to domestic law.321 With regard to the difficult 
procedures of amending the CISG, occasions may arise where a gap-filling with principles, 
which are outside the Convention, is the only alternative to maintain the workability of the 
CISG under changed circumstances. Although a situation where this would be necessary 
has to date not emerged, the probabilities increase with the age of a code,322 and therefore, it 
cannot be excluded that, in the future, a resort to good faith under Art. 7(1) CISG might be 
the only possibility to keep the CISG operational.323 
 
2. Contradictory Values within the CISG 
The CISG does not provide an express mechanism to solve conflicts which are caused by 
two contradictory values or principles of the Convention. As an example, on the one hand, 
Art. 40 CISG does not allow the seller to rely on his rights if he knew that the goods lacked 
conformity. On the other hand, Art. 35(3) CISG states that the seller is not liable if the buyer 
knew in advance that the goods lacked conformity. The CISG does, however, not regulate 
situations where both, seller and buyer, knew or ought to have known about the lack of con-
formity. Good faith under Art. 7(1) CISG can lead to the conclusion that the degree of wrong 
is decisive and, hence, the CISG puts the interests of a merely negligent party above those 
of a fraudulent party.324 
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323 This would, of course, require a certain extent of consensus about the values that are imported into the CISG. 
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324 See for this situation Oberlandesgericht Köln (Germany), 21 May 1995, 22 U 4/96 (CISG-Online) in detail 
Chapter 3, D, II, 2 below. 
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D. Filling the Gaps with an Inductive Approach to Good Faith 
It can be concluded that the only undisputed function of good faith in the CISG - the interpre-
tation of ambiguous terms in the CISG provisions - will have to be applied to a significantly 
lesser degree than in domestic law. This is due to the 'open' terms which are included in the 
specific provisions, and which provide space for discretion. 
 
Good faith does not have a supplementing function with regard to the parties' obligations 
under the contract. As interpretation refers to the actual intentions of the parties and trade 
usages depend on factual set-ups, a general duty to co-operate as a principle under Art. 7(2) 
CISG could build a powerful instrument to take over a supplementary function and impose 
additional obligations on the contract parties as it is known in German law. 
 
With regard to the corrective function, it has been shown that there exist various instruments 
to fill gaps praeter legem or restrict rights, such as interpretation, analogies and general prin-
ciples. Furthermore, the limited scope of the provision does not force adjudicators to solve 
inconsistencies in other areas of the law, such as the law of delict, through good faith. 
Hence, the role of good faith appears to be far more restricted than is the case in German 
law. Thus, the role of a subsidiary general principle of good faith with regard to the corrective 
function is limited to two situations. Firstly, where two values of the CISG lead to contradic-
tory results. Secondly, where values from outside the CISG have to be introduced to the 
Convention as a last resort in order to maintain its effectiveness. 
 
It is stated that neither of these areas of application of good faith can be specified through a 
deductive analysis. It can be predicted from the experiences with good faith in domestic law, 
that the discovery of gaps in the CISG and the filling of these gaps with good faith, can only 
be achieved by the application of the Convention on a case by case basis in practice, and, 
thus, with an inductive method. It will be seen in Chapter 3 the extent to which the judicial 
practice has developed the scope of good faith in the CISG. 
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Chapter 3: Good Faith in the CISG Case Law 
The previous chapter has examined the scope and content of good faith under the CISG 
from a theoretical point of view. It has been shown that the deductive approach, i.e. the at-
tempt to 'concretise', or to determine the scope of a general principle by deducing particular 
doctrines or derivatives from the general term, are destined to fail. As in domestic systems of 
law, good faith in the CISG cannot be approached in a deductive way, reappeared under the 
CISG but only inductively. 
 
It has been seen in Chapter 1, however, that a general principle can, nevertheless, be devel-
oped to a sophisticated system, which serves the purpose to provide certainty and predict-
ability. This development has to be achieved on a case-by-case basis, accompanied by 
scholarly analysis, as it has been done, for example, in German law. Two observations can 
be made with regard to this inductive approach to developing 'open norms' or general princi-
ples in German law: firstly, the older a code becomes the more likely it is that there are gaps 
to be filled.325 This is not only due to the fact that it normally takes some time to discover 
gaps inherent to the system of the code at the time of its drafting, but also to the change of 
circumstances that make an adoption of new rules or the alteration of old rules necessary.326  
 
Secondly, there seems, under codes drafted in a civil law tradition, to be a tendency to look 
for possibilities to extend the scope of application, once a certain doctrine or principle has 
been identified.327 In this regard, the concerns of common law lawyers that the mere exis-
tence of an 'open norm' or general principle will lead to the development of a body of case 
law that, sooner or later, overshadows the actual written rules of the CISG are not unjusti-
                                                
325 Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws, p. 10. 
326 Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws, p. 10. 
327 The most striking example for this observation under German law is probably not the Treu und Glauben provi-
sion of § 242 BGB but the German law against unfair competition, a law of delict that is regulated in the Ge-
setz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb of 1896 and - until recently - based almost completely on the two 
Generalklauseln (general clauses) §§ 1, 3 UWG which prohibit every conduct that is against the bona mores 
(gute Sitten) of the trade. The term bona mores is understood not as a factual but as a normative term and is, 
hence, determined by the judges. This led over the one hundred years of application to the result that most of 
the methods of advertising and distribution which were permissible in other countries were considered illegal 
in Germany as there was a tendency to find always new doctrines or new areas of application for established 
doctrines. Although the consumer is, today, assumed to be more informed than hundred years ago, this de-
velopment was not reflected in the development of German unfair competition law. It was only the pressure 
from European Community legislation and the case law of the European Court of Justice that led recently to a 
change in view within the thinking of the German legislative and the German Supreme Court. This example 
becomes even more striking if one looks for a comparison, again, to English law and the development of the 
passing off claim, which, as part of the piecemeal approach of the common law, has been extremely reluctant 
to forbid conducts that were established in a trade and did not amount to misrepresentation or fraud. 
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fied.328 Even lawyers from civil law jurisdictions hope that case law relating to good faith in 
the CISG will not develop to the extent it has reached, for example, in German law.329 
 
It will be examined in the following chapter whether the two observations with regard to Ger-
man law are true for the CISG. It will be analysed to which extent courts and tribunals re-
ferred to good faith during the now more than fifteen years of the application of the CISG and 
how these references comply with the theories of good faith under the CISG as analysed in 
Chapter 2 above. 
 
A. Introduction 
Internet databases collecting case law with regard to the CISG contain currently approxi-
mately sixty reported decisions referring to good faith.330 However, these decisions vary not 
only in the quality of reasoning,331 but also in the importance of good faith for the findings of 
the decision. 
 
There are five categories of decisions that are of no interest for this study, as they, though 
mentioning good faith in their reasoning, do not contribute to a development of the general 
principle of good faith. First, decisions which are decided under domestic law and the princi-
ple of good faith under the CISG is only used as a reference for the reasoning in a case that 
is actually not decided under the CISG.332 These decisions may show that the CISG is an 
important legal instrument in commercial law, which may influence not only the international 
lex mercatoria, but also the developments under domestic law. They are, however, not help-
ful in determining good faith under the CISG. 
 
                                                
328 Cf. e.g. Sim, sec. IV, B, 2: 'Applying this to the problem of good faith in the CISG, it is thus likely that the civil-
ians will continue to push for a more substantive role for good faith while their common law counterparts resist 
it. It is interesting to note, for example, that many of the cases that advocate a more substantive role for good 
faith emanate from civil law jurisdictions.' 
329 Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws, p. 8. 
330 The three most important of which are: the UNILEX website available under http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm; 
the Pace Law School website available under http://cisg.law.pace.edu/cisgcases.html; and the database 
CISG-Online administered by the University of Basel, available under http:/www.cisg-online.ch. See for a de-
scription of these three databases Sim, sec. V, B. 
331 Cf. e.g. Sim, sec. IV, A: 'At times, these courts or tribunals issue their decisions without any recognition of the 
debate surrounding the concept of good faith in the Convention and without an examination of the ramifica-
tions of its findings on the role of good faith in the CISG.' 
332 Cf. e.g. New South Wales Court of Appeal (Australia), Renard Constructions v Minister for Public Works, 12 
March 1992 (UNILEX); Court of Appeals Wellington (New Zealand), 3 October 2001, CA 245/00 (UNILEX). 
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Second, decisions which rely upon good faith only in order to confirm a result that has previ-
ously been established based on different arguments.333 In these decisions good faith is only 
used in a very unspecific way, and is more a statement of policy in order to reassure the ad-
judicators that they act on the side of justice. Such references do also not contribute to the 
development of good faith, and are, hence, redundant.334 
 
Third, decisions that state that the CISG contains a general principle of good faith in an obiter 
dictum but then resolve the case not on the basis of good faith, and sometimes do not even 
apply the Convention at all.335 
 
Fourth, decisions that mention good faith as a general principle under the CISG in such a 
broad and unspecific context that they are not of any help determining the scope or content 
of good faith.336 
 
Fifth, there are a number of decisions where courts mention the principle of good faith, with 
or without a citation of Art. 7(1) CISG, while they are actually interpreting the contract and 
are, thus, applying Art. 8 CISG.337 It seems that this is the result of a careless use of termi-
nology. These decisions appear to confuse the specific objective standard of reasonableness 
in Art. 8(2) CISG with the general principle of good faith. A confusion that might be due to the 
fact that rules of interpretation in domestic law use the term 'good faith' instead of 'reason-
able'.338 This improper use of terminology does not contribute to the development of the gen-
eral principle of good faith and is, consequently, of no interest for the following analysis. 
                                                
333 Cf. e.g. Arrondessementrechtsbank Zwolle (Netherlands), CME v Bos Fishproducts, 5 March 1997, HA ZA 95-
640 (UNILEX); U.S. District Court, S. D., New York, Geneva Pharmaceuticals v Barr Laboratories et al., 
10 May 2002, 98 Civ. 861 and 99 Civ. 3607 (UNILEX); Hof van Beroep Ghent (Belgium), 15 May 2002 
(UNILEX). 
334 Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws, p. 10. 
335 Cf. e.g. Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 9 January 2002, VIII ZR 304/00; Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria), 
22 October 2001, 1 Ob 49/01i (UNILEX); Oberlandesgericht Saarbrücken (Germany), 13 January 1993, 1 U 
69/92 (CISG-Online). 
336 Cf. e.g. Federal Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit (U.S.A.), 11 June 2003, 02-20166, BP Oil Int. et al. v 
PetroEcuador et al. (UNILEX); cf. furthermore Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry Court of Arbi-
tration, 17 November 1995, VB/94124 (UNILEX), which cites Art. 7(1) CISG in conjunction with Art. 8(3) CISG 
and the possibility of existing trade customs; the tribunal then states with reference to commentary literature 
that good faith under Art. 7(1) also applies to the obligations of the parties, but does so in the context of a pure 
contract interpretation; thus Art. 8(2), (3) CISG would have been the exclusive provisions to solve the problem. 
Oberlandesgericht Köln (Germany), 8 January 1997, 27 U 58/95 (UNILEX) also cites good faith (Treu und 
Glauben) in a matter of contract interpretation without making clear whether it refers to Art. 7(1) CISG or to 
Art. 8(2) CISG. 
337 Cf. e.g. Cour de Cassation (France), 30 June 2004, Y 01-15.964 (UNILEX); Handelsgericht Zürich (Switzer-
land), 30 November 1998, HG 930634 (UNILEX); ICC Court of Arbitration, March 1995, No. 7645 (UNILEX); 
apparently also Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 30 October 2001, VIII ZR 60/01 (UNILEX). 
338 Cf. e.g. Handelsgericht Zürich (Switzerland), 30 November 1998, HG 930634 (UNILEX): ‘Gemäss Art. 8 WKR 
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The decisions of the third and fourth category are merely superfluous and pose no harm to 
the development of good faith. However, it should not be underestimated that decisions can 
serve as a reference for future cases, and set a 'precedent' for other decisions, even where 
the reasoning lacks consistency. Although the rules of stare decisis does not apply in the 
CISG, the general experience is that adjudicators feel as though they are on safer ground if 
they can rely on a previous decision. This danger exists, in particular, within the civil law tra-
dition where lawyers are not equally trained to consider the precedents, but are more accus-
tomed to generalising the findings of previous adjudicators. Hence, it must be feared that 
decisions, which adopt good faith as a general principle of the CISG without analysing the 
result, will be multiplied by successive decisions, and, eventually, become the 'prevailing 
view' without adding a substantial contribution to the development of the law.339 For the sub-
ject of the following analysis, however, decisions of the third and fourth group are mainly ir-
relevant despite their rather unfortunate character. 
 
The analysis of the case law complies with the three functions of good faith, as identified in 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. Hence, the positions taken by courts and tribunals with regard to 
the interpretative,340 supplementary,341 and corrective function342 of good faith under the 
CISG will be examined. 
 
B. The Interpretative Function 
Surprisingly, good faith appears not to be used by courts and tribunals in the one meaning 
that is clearly covered by the wording of Art. 7(1) CISG, and, thus, is not contentious: good 
faith as an interpretative guide in cases of textual ambiguity of provisions of the Conven-
tion.343 It is suggested that this lack of case law is not so much caused by the fact that the 
                                                
ist nämlich bei der Auslegung von Willenserklärungen stets auch Treu und Glauben zu beachten; insofern 
unterscheidet sich das WKR kaum von der schweiz. Vertrauenstheorie’ [According to Art. 8 CISG the principle 
of good faith has always to be observed in the interpretation of the statement of a party, so far, there is hardly 
a difference between the CISG and the Swiss theory of fidelity in interpretation]. See for the German rule of in-
terpretation of § 157 BGB, Chapter 1, sec. C, I, 1 above. 
339 An example is reiteration in decisions that good faith under Art. 7(1) CISG also applies to the contract interpre-
tation without arguing why the scope of the norm is extended beyond its clear wording; cf. for respective deci-
sions section C, I below. Other courts rely on these decisions, and, subsequently, a body of case law emerges 
without a seminal case, which would provide a legal reasoning for the alleged function of good faith. 
340 See section B below. 
341 See section C below. 
342 See section D below. 
343 This analysis can of course not claim to cover the complete published case law, due to the numerous possible 
sources of published decisions. Cf. however Sim, sec. IV, A, 6, who also seems not to have found an example 
for this function of good faith in the CISG as he, instead, discusses the award of Internationales 
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CISG does not contain textual ambiguities but, rather to the contrary, that the drafters in-
cluded objective standards, such as 'reasonableness', directly in provisions where they 
thought that minima gaps could emerge. These objective standards provide sufficient flexibil-
ity to deal with detailed situations, which the parties did not regulate in their contract within 
the specific CISG provision itself. Thus, a resort to a general principle of good faith is, other 
than in German law, not necessary. 
 
It has been noted in section A that the principle of good faith is cited with regard to the inter-
pretation of the contract.344 However, this function is regulated by Art. 8(2) CISG, which re-
fers to the understanding of a 'reasonable person' where the parties' intention cannot be de-
termined. Hence, Art. 8(2) CISG is yet another example where the objective-normative 
standard of the specific rule makes a reference to the general principle of good faith super-
fluous. Thus, the citation of Art. 7 CISG in cases of mere contract interpretation345 does not 
contribute to the development of the general principle of good faith. 
 
C. The Supplementary Function 
With regard to whether or not good faith under the CISG can be a source of rights and duties 
of the parties to the sales contract, the case law is inconsistent. There have been decisions 
stating that Art. 7(1) CISG applies to the interpretation of the Convention only,346 without, 
however, scrutinising whether another result could be reached in adopting good faith as a 
general principle under Art. 7(2) CISG. Other decisions have stated that there is a ‘general 
duty of information and co-operation’ with regard to the other contract party.347 It has to be 
seen whether these decisions lead to actual legal duties for a contract party. Where they do, 
the relation between the general principle of good faith and these duties has to be examined. 
 
                                                
Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft Wien (Austria), 15 June 1994, SCH-4318 
(UNILEX) that does not deal with the interpretation of the Convention under Art. 7(1) CISG but with gap-filling 
under Art. 7(2) CISG. See for a discussion of this award sec. D, I, 1 below. 
344 Cf. e.g. Cour de Cassation (France), 30 June 2004, Y 01-15.964 (UNILEX); Handelsgericht Zürich (Switzer-
land), 30 November 1998, HG 930634 (UNILEX); ICC Court of Arbitration, March 1995, No. 7645 (UNILEX); 
apparently also Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 30 October 2001, VIII ZR 60/01 (UNILEX). 
345 The situation is different where the contract is not only interpreted but objectively supplemented. Art. 8 CISG 
does not help in these cases as there is no conduct or statement of the parties. Thus, a resort to good faith 
within Art. 7 CISG might be discussed, see section C below. 
346 Cf. e.g. ICC Court of Arbitration, W. v R., 23 January 1997, 8611/HV/JK (UNILEX). 
347 See the cited cases in sections I and II below. 
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I. The Incorporation of Standard Terms in the Sales Contract 
One of the issues that were recognised but not solved by the drafters of the CISG are the 
requirements that have to be fulfilled for standard terms and conditions to be included in the 
contract, particularly if each party wants to include their own standard terms ('battle of 
forms'). The issue has to be resolved with regard to the provisions about the formation of the 
contract (Art. 14 - 24 CISG), and the parties' statements and conduct have to be interpreted 
according to Art. 8 CISG. There are, however, decisions which seem to deduce from the 
general principle of good faith a duty requiring one party to inform the other party about the 
specific content of its standard terms. The German Supreme Court stated that '[i]t would be 
contradictory to the principle of good faith in international trade (Art. 7(1) CISG) as well as 
the general duty of co-operation and information with regard to the other party [...] to impose 
an obligation on the other party to ask for the transmission of the standard terms...'.348 A 
Dutch court deduced from Dutch and French law as well as from the Principles of European 
Contract law a duty for a party to take reasonable steps to bring its standard terms to the 
other party's attention before or when the contract is concluded.349 This case law led to the 
generalisation that a party that wishes to incorporate standard terms must show good faith 
efforts to communicate those terms to the other party.350 
 
The question is, however, whether these decisions really impose a positive duty to act351 in 
good faith on the contract parties.352 Such a positive duty, since neither expressly agreed, 
nor implied by the parties, would be a supplement to the parties' contract terms. A legal duty, 
however, is that which one ought, or ought not to do.353 The implication of the violation of a 
duty is that a correlative right is invaded.354 Thus, if there was a legal duty of a party to inform 
about its the own standard terms and conditions, an omission of this information would 
                                                
348 Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 30 October 2001, VIII ZR 60/01 (UNILEX): [Es widerspräche daher dem 
Grundsatz des guten Glaubens im internationalen Handel (Art. 7 Abs. 1 CISG) sowie der allgemeinen 
Kooperations- und Informationspflicht der Parteien, dem Vertragspartner eine Erkundigungsobliegenheit 
hisichtlich der nicht übersandten Klauselwerke aufzuerlegen und ihm die Risiken und Nachteile nicht 
bekannter gegnerischer Allgemeiner Geschäftsbedingungen aufzubürden...']. 
349 Hof 'S-Hertogenbosch (Netherlands), 16 October 2002 (UNILEX). 
350 DiMatteo et al., 24 NW. J. Int'l L. & B 299 at 347. 
351 As opposed to the general requirement not to act in bad faith. 
352 In this sense apparently UNCITRAL Digest of case law on the United Nations Convention on the International 
Sale of Goods, document A/CN.9/SER.C/DIGEST/CISG/7, sec. 9, available on the UNCITRAL website 
www.uncitral.org. 
353 Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, 23 Yale Law Journal 16 at 32. 
354 Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, 23 Yale Law Journal 16 at 32. 
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amount to a breach of contract, with the effect that the other party could claim damages un-
der Art. 74 CISG.  
 
It is very unlikely that the cited decisions intended to imply these consequences. The more 
realistic understanding is that if one party does not inform the other party about its standard 
terms, it cannot be expected that the other party has tacitly accepted the standard terms.355 
The reason why the party cannot rely on an implied acceptance of its standard terms is that it 
cannot be assumed that a 'reasonable person', as required by Art. 8(2) CISG, would agree to 
terms it has no knowledge of. This, however, seems to be a confusion of the interpretation of 
the Convention under observance of good faith (Art. 7(1) CISG), and the standard of reason-
ableness in Art. 8(2) CISG. Hence, the cited decisions do not impose supplementary duties 
on the contract parties, but only specify the standard of reasonableness in Art. 8(2) CISG 
with regard to the incorporation of standard terms into the sales contract.  
 
II. Duty to Continue Long-Term Contractual Relations 
Good faith in the civil law tradition is based on the idea that parties who enter into a contrac-
tual agreement have a closer social relationship than other persons without contractual ties. 
Hence, duties of co-operation and consideration increase with the intensity of the contractual 
relation. This has led the German courts to state that in long term business relations the prin-
ciple of good faith can lead to a duty of the seller to supply the buyer with goods even after 
the relationship has been terminated. This has been held in cases where the buyer de-
pended on the delivery of spare parts or where the buyer relied on delivery of goods that 
belonged to a series of products. Such a duty to deliver amounts to a supplement of the par-
ties' contract terms. 
 
In one decision concerning the termination of an exclusive distribution agreement, the arbitral 
tribunal expressly referred to the German case law, but refused to accept a similar duty to 
deliver spare parts under Art. 7(1) CISG, as this provision only applies to the interpretation of 
                                                
355 It might be noteworthy that the German jurisprudence distinguishes between Rechtspflichten (legal duties) and 
Obliegenheiten (obligations in the meaning of a responsibility with regard to the party's own interest). 
Obliegenheit means that it is in the party's own best interest to act, as it otherwise loses rights or remedies, 
but an omission to act does not violate the other party's rights (cf. Larenz/Wolf, § 16, sec. 48). What is some-
times called a 'duty to inspect' under Art. 38(1) CISG is not a legal duty in the actual meaning, as the non-
inspection by the seller does not lead to the violation of a right of the seller. It merely leads to the loss of the 
buyer's right to rely on the lack of conformity, Art. 39(2) CISG. According to the German terminology, 
Art. 38(1) CISG, thus, imposes an Obliegenheit on the buyer, not a Rechtspflicht. Consequently, the above 
cited decision Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 30 October 2001, VIII ZR 60/01 (UNILEX) refers to an 
Obliegenheit ('Erkundigungsobliegenheit'), a distinction that gets lost in the English translation 'obligation [...] 
to ask'. 
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the Convention and could not be referred to as a source of the parties' obligations under the 
contract.356 
 
Other decisions have not been so clear in rejecting a duty to deliver after the termination of 
long term business relations. In German court proceedings the buyer asserted, as an addi-
tional argument, that he could claim further delivery based on good faith, and that the seller 
was in breach of contract because he had failed to perform. The court did not have to defini-
tively decide whether such a claim could be brought forward under the CISG. It held that 
even if such a right to demand further delivery existed, it would require that the buyer himself 
acts in accordance with the contract. As the buyer, however, refused to pay outstanding 
debts from previous deliveries without legal reason, the requirements of the asserted claim 
were not fulfilled.357 
 
In a Finnish decision a court held that the seller was in breach of contract as he had the duty 
not to end the business relation abruptly. This duty derived not from the single sales transac-
tion, but from a general framework agreement. The court cited a general duty to co-operate 
under the CISG as applicable law: 
'[T]he so-called principle of loyalty has been widely recognized in scholarly writings. 
According to this principle, the parties to a contract have to act in favor of the com-
mon goal; they have to reasonably consider the interests of the other party.'358 
The court then held in its conclusions that 
'...during the existence of the import agreement [buyer] had committed itself to de-
livering goods to Company B and that [seller] was aware of this. The cancellation of 
the import agreement by [seller] has resulted in a failure to fulfil these commitments. 
This Court of Appeals agrees with the view of Witness P, that even though an im-
porter by definition acts on his own behalf and at his own risk, the operations cannot 
be based on a risk of an abrupt ending of a contract. Consequently, [seller], in the 
manner described in and on the basis of the legal considerations of the judgment of 
the Court of First Instance, is under a duty to pay damages to [buyer] for loss result-
ing from liability to a third party, Company B.'359 
                                                
356 ICC Court of Arbitration, W. v R., 23 January 1997, 8611/HV/JK (UNILEX), where such a duty to supply spare 
parts was, however, eventually based on a trade usage 
357 Oberlandesgericht Saarbrücken, 13 January 1993, 1 U 69/92 (UNILEX, full text in German only, problem not 
mentioned in English abstract): '...wenn man eine Pflicht der Klägerin zur Weiterbelieferung der Beklagten 
unabhängig vom Bestehen eines Sukzessivlieferungsvertrages aus der sortimentsbedingten Angewiesenheit 
der Beklagten auf Ergänzungslieferungen nach Treu und Glauben herleiten wolle, eine solche 
Weiterbelieferungsverpflichtung der Klägerin jedenfalls im Hinblick darauf erloschen sei, daß die Beklagte die 
Zahlung des der Klägerin im angefochtenen Urteil zuerkannten Betrages zu Unrecht verweigert habe.'  
358 Helsingin Hoviokeus (Finland), 26 October 2000, S00/82 (Pace Law School website). 
359 Helsingin Hoviokeus (Finland), 26 October 2000, S00/82 (Pace Law School website). 
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It is, however, not entirely clear from the reasoning whether the court based the duty to de-
liver on a general principle that the parties have to co-operate according to Art. 7(2) CISG, or 
on a trade usage or a tacit agreement of the parties deduced from an interpretation accord-
ing to Art. 8(2) CISG.360 
 
It seems that courts show a certain tendency to accept that if a buyer in a long term business 
relationship could reasonably rely on the expectation to be supplied in the future, the buyer 
has a right to demand supply even after the business relationship ended, provided the buyer 
was not himself in breach of contract. However, the case law is not consistent, and it cannot 
be said that a respective doctrine has emerged. Moreover, it is not clear what the pivotal ar-
gument in the legal reasoning is. It appears, however, that adjudicators prefer to argue with 
contract interpretation and trade usage, in other words on a factual basis, rather than to base 
the duty merely on the, normative, general principle of good faith. 
 
D. The Corrective Function 
It has been stated in Chapter 1 that the corrective function is seen as the most far-reaching 
function which the principle of good faith can fulfil, as the restriction of rights as well as the 
derogation from express rules are a direct interference with the legislator's intentions. To 
date, the use of the corrective function of good faith is rarely encountered within the case law 
under the CISG. A few examples exist and it will be seen that they import tried and tested 
solutions from domestic law into the CISG. 
 
I. The Restriction of Rights 
Within the restricting function of good faith, courts and arbitral tribunals refer to the underly-
ing principles known from legal doctrines that were developed under domestic law in order to 
prevent parties from the unlimited exercise of their contractual rights, such as waiver, estop-
pel, venire contra factum proprium, and Verwirkung. As such doctrines are, in the German 
influenced jurisdictions, based on good faith, it does not come as a surprise that the leading 
cases were rendered by adjudicators from Germany, Austria and Switzerland. 
 
                                                
360 DiMatteo et al., 24 NW. J. Int'l L. & B 299 at 317 seem to be very clear that the decisive argument was a gen-
eral principle under Art. 7(2) CISG. 
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1. Inconsistent Behaviour 
It has been stated in Chapter 2 above that in scholarly writing a general principle of the pro-
hibition of inconsistent behaviour is deduced from Art. 16(2)(b) and Art. 29(2) CISG. The ap-
plication of this principle, commonly referred to by venire contra factum proprium or estoppel, 
has been confirmed by the case law.361 Furthermore, it can be stated that the prohibition of 
inconsistent behaviour is widely accepted in international trade. For example the 2004 Revi-
sion of the UNIDROIT Principles which, now, stipulate in Art. 1.8 the prohibition of inconsis-
tent behaviour as an express rule due to its importance in practice, although the prohibition 
of inconsistent behaviour still considered part of the general principle of good faith as stipu-
lated in Art. 1.7 UNIDROIT Principles.362 
 
In German law, the notion of venire contra factum proprium is also seen as part of the gen-
eral principle of good faith. Thus, it is not surprising that two German decisions subsume the 
prohibition of inconsistent behaviour under good faith in Art. 7(1) CISG: 
‘[A]ccording to Article 7(1) and Article 80 of the CISG, principles of good faith are 
relevant to the legal process. Included in this is the interdiction of venire contra fac-
tum proprium (the principle of estoppel) (Herber, in v. Caemmerer/Schlechtriem, 
Kommentar zum Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht, 2d ed., Art. 7, margin no. 37), due to 
prior inadmissible exercise of legal rights.’363 
A further example of this typically German approach to seeing inconsistent behaviour as a 
part of Art. 7(1) CISG is a decision concerned with the non-conformity of the goods under 
Art. 39 CISG:  
'[I]n the event that the buyer did examine the goods and that he expressly accepted 
the goods as being conform, then he can no longer rely on a lack of conformity - 
even if he gives notice within a reasonable time - with regard to deviations from con-
                                                
361 Cf. e.g. Internationales Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft Wien (Austria), 
15 June 1994, SCH-4318 (UNILEX); ICC Court of Arbitration, January 1997, No. 8786, ICAB 11/2, p. 70 at 73 
with further references to ICCCA cases No. 4381 and 5103, however requirements of application denied in the 
specific case; Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe (Germany), 25 June 1997, 1 U 280/96 (UNILEX), however the re-
quirements of the application of venire contra factum proprium were denied in the specific case.; Landgericht 
Mönchengladbach (Germany), 15 July 2003, 7 O 221/02, however not decisive as the case was eventually 
decided under Italian domestic law; Award of the Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Rus-
sian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Russia), 27 July 1999, 302/1996 (Pace Law School 
website), applying Art. 7(1) CISG and referring to ‘estoppel’, ‘Verwirkung’, and ‘venire contra factum proprium’ 
as well as to the provisions of good faith in the Russian civil code. 
362 Bonell, Unif. L. Rev. 2004, p. 5 at 20. 
363 Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe (Germany), 25 June 1997, 1 U 280/96 (UNILEX, English translation available on 
the Pace Law School website). A similar argumentation can be found in the decision of Landgericht 
Mönchengladbach (Germany), 15 July 2003, 7 O 221/02 (English abstract UINILEX, full text available, in 
German only, under http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/urteile/813.pdf), however, after having declared the CISG 
as applicable the court refers to the German good faith provision of § 242 BGB (and not as cited in the 
UNILEX abstract to Art. 7(1) CISG). 
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formity that he could discover during the examination. Otherwise, the buyer acts 
contrary to the duty to observe good faith according to Art. 7(1) CISG.'364 
An Austrian arbitral award gives a more detailed reasoning, and although coming from a le-
gal background which considers venire contra factum proprium a part of the general principle 
of good faith, the tribunal sees the doctrine as an independent general principle under 
Art. 7(2) CISG, while still emphasising that it forms part of a general principle of good faith:  
‘[A] given legal position (e.g. a right, a defence, etc.) can not only be intentionally 
waived but can also be objectively forfeited. This follows from the general principle 
of good faith and the closely related principle of estoppel (prohibition of venire contra 
factum proprium). Thus, a legal position of a party must be regarded as having been 
forfeited whenever that party's conduct could be construed as meaning that it no 
longer wished to exercise its right or its defence, and the other party acted in reli-
ance on the new situation […]. The CISG expressly mentions in Article 7(1) the re-
quirement of the observance of good faith in international trade. The exact signifi-
cance to be attached to the general principle of good faith within the scope of the 
Convention may be disputed […]. However, at the least the principle of estoppel or, 
to use another expression, the prohibition of venire contra factum proprium, which 
represents a special application of the general principle of good faith, may without 
doubt be seen as one of the "general principles on which the Convention is based", 
which according to Article 7(2) of the CISG may be invoked to solve the question of 
a possible forfeiture of the defence of late notice, not expressly settled in the Con-
vention […].365 
It appears that the prohibition of inconsistent behaviour is generally seen as a good faith doc-
trine that is applicable under the CISG,366 despite the disagreement of whether it should be 
located in para 1 or 2 of Art. 7 CISG. The most common way of deducing the principle is the 
reference to Art. 16(2)(b) and Art. 29(2) CISG. However, it must be noted that neither schol-
arly writing, nor the case law provide reasons as to why these two Articles of the CISG con-
tain a rule that can be generalised, and not only two single provisions for specific cases. As 
with every generalisation, it can be asked why the legislator did not expressly stipulate a 
general prohibition of inconsistent behaviour if he saw it as a general principle. It can only be 
assumed that the prohibition of inconsistent behaviour is so deeply rooted in every domestic 
legal system that adjudicators do not feel the necessity of a detailed reasoning. 
                                                
364 [Hat der Käufer die Ware untersucht und nimmt er sie dem Verkäufer gegenüber ausdrücklich als 
vertragsgemäß ab, dann kann er nicht mehr - auch nicht binnen angemessener Frist - solche Fehler rügen, 
die bei der Untersuchung feststellbar waren. Andernfalls setzte er sich mit dem eigenen Verhalten in 
Widerspruch und verstieße gegen das Gutglaubensgebot des Art. 7 Abs. 1 CISG (Staudinger-Magnus, a. a. 
O., Art. 39 CISG, Rd.-Nr. 20).] Landgericht Saarbrücken, 26 March 1996, 7 IV 75/95 (UNILEX, full text in 
German only). 
365 Cf. e.g. Internationales Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft Wien (Austria), 
15 June 1994, SCH-4318 (UNILEX). 
366 There is, however, one decision that denies that estoppel is covered by the scope of the CISG, cf. Rechtsbank 
Amsterdam (Netherlands), 5 October 1994 as cited by UNCITRAL Digest of case law on the United Nations 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods, document A/CN.9/SER.C/DIGEST/CISG/7, sec. 10 (in Fn. 24), 
available on the UNCITRAL website www.uncitral.org. 
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2. Rights not Exercised timely (Waiver or Verwirkung) 
A number of decisions appear to accept a general principle of the CISG, which states that a 
party who does not exercise its rights timely is not permitted to do so at a later stage if the 
other party has relied upon the conduct.367 This principle is known in German law as Ver-
wirkung, a doctrine based on Treu und Glauben under § 242 BGB. The consequences are 
that the creditor is suspended in the execution of his right. Verwirkung must be distinguished 
from Verzicht, which means that a party makes a unilateral statement, containing an express 
or implied declaration that it does not want to exercise its right any longer. Verzicht has the 
effect of a contract variation, and its legal consequence is that the right in question extin-
guishes. Hence the equation of Verwirkung with the common law doctrine of waiver might be 
misleading as the element of 'promise' or 'representation' shows similarities to the German 
doctrine of Verzicht, whereas the legal consequences of waiver are, usually, only suspen-
sory.368 
 
Moreover, in German law the prohibition of venire contra factum proprium, and the doctrine 
of Verwirkung are considered to be related in so far as both require an element of reasonable 
reliance on the conduct (that can also be seen in an omission to act) of the other party.369 
This relation is also present in the case law on the CISG, and it is not always entirely clear 
which doctrine the decisions are actually based on. This uncertainty seems to be amplified 
by the fact that English terms such as 'forfeiture', 'waiver', and 'forbearance', especially in 
cases where the adjudicators come from civil law jurisdictions, are far from being used con-
sistently. An example of this confusion is the decision of the Appellate Court of Munich.370 In 
this case the seller, first, wanted to deliver within the contractually agreed time frame but the 
buyer refused the acceptance of delivery due to problems with the currency rate. Subse-
quently, the buyer remained silent for more than two years, and then wanted to avoid the 
contract due to non-performance by the seller. The court held: 
'[I]n the light of such situation, it would be against the principles of good faith if the 
[buyer] were entitled to claim any rights with regard to the non-performance of the 
                                                
367 Cf. e.g. Oberlandesgericht München, 8 February 1995, 7 U 1720/94 (UNILEX); Internationales Schiedsgericht 
der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft Wien (Austria), 15 June 1994, SCH-4318 (UNILEX) where 
the waiver was, however, denied due to lack of evidence; Handelsgericht Zürich (Switzerland), 30 November 
1998, HG 930634 (UNILEX) where it was held that the mere readiness to discuss the issue is not a conduct 
the other party can reasonably rely on; Arrondissementrechtsbank Arnheim (Netherlands), Kunsthaus Math. 
Lepertz v W. van der Geld, 17 July 1997 (UNILEX), although only as an additional argument. 
368 Cf. in detail Treitel, p. 97 ff, and Chapter 1, section B, II, 3 above. 
369 Cf. Larenz/Wolf, § 16, sec. 46. Roth, § 242, sec. 323 classifies Verwirkung as a sub-category of venire contra 
factum proprium. 
370 Oberlandesgericht München, 8 February 1995, 7 U 1720/94 (UNILEX). 
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sales contract. Since the [buyer] herself first affected the non-performance and 
waited approximately 2 ½ years before she claimed termination of the contract. Ac-
cording to an analogous application of the legal theory of Art. 80 CISG, any claim of 
damages, i.e., suffered loss of profits, has been forfeited under all circumstances 
(see v. Caemmerer/Schlechtriem, op. cit., Art. 49 No. 35).'371 
It is not entirely clear whether the court sees the decisive element in the fact that the buyer 
refused to accept delivery, a circumstance that would justify the reference to Art. 80 CISG, or 
in the two and a half years in which the buyer did not exercise its contractual rights, and, that 
is exclusively an element of time. The latter alternative can, if one chooses not to see it as a 
particular case of inconsistent behaviour, be based on a general principle of good faith. 
 
The reference to the principle of good faith by the court has been criticised. First, the result 
as such was contested, as it was understood that the court had held that a general duty to 
act in good faith is a prerequisite to exercise rights under the Convention.372 Such a general 
duty can, however, not be read out of the reasoning. It becomes clear from the wording that 
the court uses good faith as an exemption from the rule, Art. 49 CISG, which does not limit 
the time to claim performance. Good faith corrected a result that was deemed unjust be-
cause it was the buyer's conduct that led the seller to rely on the fact that performance would 
no longer be claimed. Good faith, thus, was used to fulfil a typically restrictive function. 
 
Second, the reference to good faith was criticised as this could have been reached by anal-
ogy and a deduction of a general principle of the Convention according to Art. 7(2) CISG.373 
The problem is, however, that all the provisions of the CISG that provide for a timely exercise 
of a right refer to remedies in case of a breach of contract by the other party.374 The case 
decided by the Appellate Court of Munich, however, involved a seller who acted in conformity 
                                                
371 [Grund der Nichtauslieferung war somit eine zur Herbeiführung des Leistungserfolgs nötige 
Mitwirkungshandlung der Klägerin selbst. Daß sie in der Folgezeit die Beklagte zur Lieferung der Pkw 
aufgefordert hätte - etwa nach Stabilisierung der Währungsverhältnisse - hat sie nicht behauptet; dafür, daß 
die Beklagte die Lieferung endgültig verweigert hätte, bzw. - trotz der zwischenzeitlich erfolgten Abbestellung - 
völlig außerstande gewesen wäre, die Fahrzeuge dennoch der Klägerin innerhalb angemessener Frist zur 
Verfügung zu stellen, ergibt sich nichts. Angesichts dieser Situation würde es aber Treu und Glauben 
widersprechen, wenn die Klägerin nunmehr, nachdem sie zunächst selbst die Nichterfüllung verursacht und 
mit der Aufhebung des Vertrags eines weiteren Erfüllungsverlangen ca. 2 1/2 Jahre zugewartet hat, Rechte 
aus der Nichterfüllung herleiten würde. In entsprechender Anwendung des Rechtsgedanken des Art. 80 CISG 
wären Schadensersatzansprüche jedenfalls verwirkt (v. Caemmerer/Schlechtriem a. a. O. Art. 49 RdNr. 35)], 
Oberlandesgericht München, 8 February 1995, 7 U 1720/94 (UNILEX).  
372 Sim, sec. IV, A, 3: 'The court's holding, therefore, must have been predicated on an unspoken assumption that 
all parties had to observe good faith before they could invoke the rights and remedies of the Convention. This 
amounts to the imposition of substantive obligations of good faith on the party and contradicts the express 
wording of Article 7(1).'' 
373 Sim, sec. IV, A, 3: '[I]t is a pity that the court felt that it had to resort to the "blunt cleaver" of a good faith obliga-
tion when it could have availed itself of more specific principles that would have been more sensitive to the 
context.' 
374 Cf. the examples of Art. 40(2), 39, 43 CISG as cited by Sim , sec. IV, A, 3. 
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with the contract. Hence, an analogy with the express CISG rules would not fit. However, it is 
felt that a seller who acts in conformity of the contract needs even more protection than a 
seller who committed a breach of contract. This a majore ad minus argument is a clear mani-
festation of a general principle of good faith. 
 
3. The Forfeiture of Rights by the Conduct of a Party 
It appears that the majority of decisions, which hold that a party may no longer rely on a right 
provided by the CISG or the contract, are based on not only a certain period of time that the 
other party failed to act within, but on a particular conduct. In one case the court stated that a 
seller can forfeit his right to rely on the fact that the buyer had not given the notice of lack of 
conformity timely (Art. 39 CISG), if the seller agreed to examine the goods himself even once 
a reasonable time has passed.375 In another case the court denied the plaintiff the right of 
retention, with reference to good faith, as the defendant could rely on the fact that the plaintiff 
did not claim the right of retention previously in similar situations.376 The German Supreme 
Court held that the German principles of Verzicht developed under the German Commercial 
Code can be applied without modification under the CISG.377 
 
It is stated that these cases of forfeiture of a right are based on a variation of the original con-
tractual agreement between the parties, and can, hence, be solved exclusively by the appli-
cation of the interpretative rules of Art. 8 CISG, which expressly refer to the subsequent con-
duct of a party after the conclusion of the contract. Due to the principle of informality in the 
CISG (Art. 11 CISG), a variation of the contract does not require 'consideration'.378 Hence, 
the resort to doctrines of estoppel or waiver can be avoided by a mere contract interpretation. 
Nevertheless, where the principle of good faith is mentioned by the courts, it might be due to 
a confusion of the terminology, as they obviously refer to the standard of reasonableness 
                                                
375 [Schließlich kann der Verkäufer auch auf das Recht, sich auf die Nichteinhaltung der Mängelrügefrist zu 
berufen, verzichten [...] Ein solcher Verzicht kann sich auch aus dem Verhalten des Verkäufers ergeben, so 
wenn er sich auf eine verspätete Beanstandung ernsthaft, insbesondere durch Untersuchung der Ware durch 
einen Sachverständigen, einlässt.], Handelsgericht Zürich (Switzerland), 30 November 1998, HG 930634 
(UNILEX), in the particular case the court, however, denied a forfeiture as the facts did not comply with the re-
quirements. Cf. furthermore Schlechtriem/Schwenzer, Commentary, Art. 39, sec. 33: ‘[T]he seller may waive 
the objection that that notice was not or not correctly given; such a waiver may even be implicit. A waiver can 
always be assumed to have been made if the seller unreservedly acknowledges the lack of conformity, takes 
back the goods, states that he is willing to repair them or deliver substitute goods, or agrees without reserva-
tion to an examination of the notified defect.' 
376 Oberlandesgericht Köln (Germany), 8 January 1997, 27 U 58/95 (UNILEX). 
377 Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 28 November 1998, VIII ZR 259/97, (CISG-Online, http://www.cisg-
online.ch/cisg/urteile/353.htm) with respect to Art. 39(1) CISG and § 377 HGB. 
378 See for the fact that promissory estopple in English law correlates to the English law doctrine of consideration, 
Chapter 1, section B, II, 3 above. 
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within Art. 8(2) CISG.379 Thus, it can be stated that the forfeiture, in the meaning mentioned 
above, is not related to the general principle of good faith, but is strictly a matter of interpreta-
tion of the parties’ statements and conduct. 
 
II. Derogating from Express Rules 
The restrictive function of good faith can be seen as a specific case where a derogation from 
express rules takes place - the exercise of a right is not admitted although the right is granted 
by the law or the contract terms. Thus, within the following paragraph the use of good faith is 
analysed where it does not lead to a restriction of a right, but to an improvement of a legal 
position, as compared to the strict rules of the law or the contract terms. 
 
1. No Declaration Required if its Purpose can no Longer be Fulfilled 
It was held by the Appellate Court of Hamburg380 that although Art. 75 CISG requires a dec-
laration of avoidance in the case of a substitute transaction, such a declaration is not neces-
sary where the seller finally and definitely refuses to deliver. The seller had problems to de-
liver the agreed goods as his own supplier did not deliver. After an exchange of several faxes 
in which the parties negotiated with respect to the further proceedings, the buyer eventually 
bought replacement goods elsewhere. The buyer then sued for damages caused by the dif-
ference between the contract price and the market price of the replacement goods. The court 
accepted that the late delivery amounted to a fundamental breach of contract, however, 
doubts remained whether the fax letters of the buyer contained a declaration of avoidance 
(Art. 49(1) CISG).381 The court did not have to decide the matter as it came to the conclusion 
                                                
379 See in particular Handelsgericht Zürich (Switzerland), 30 November 1998, HG 930634 (UNILEX); but also 
Oberlandesgericht Köln (Germany), 8 January 1997, 27 U 58/95 (UNILEX). 
380 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, 28 February 1997, 1 U 167/95 (CISG-Online, German text only, English abstract 
in UNILEX). 
381 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, 28 February 1997, 1 U 167/95 (CISG-Online, German text only): ‘Dahingestellt 
bleiben kann, ob die Klägerin vor der Vornahme des Deckungskaufes die Aufhebung des Kaufvertrages 
erklärt hat, wie es Artikel 75 CISG an sich verlangt. Zweifel an einer Vertragsaufhebungserklärung vor 
Vornahme des Deckungskaufes rühren daher, daß das Fax vom 17. Januar 1995 nicht exakt belegt, wann die 
Klägerin die Beklagte von der Durchführung des Deckungskaufes und der damit einhergehenden 
konkludenten Aufhebungserklärung in Kenntnis gesetzt hat, und die zuvor von der Klägerin der Beklagten 
übersandten Schreiben, Fax vom 13. Dezember 1994, Fax vom 16. Dezember 1994 und Fax vom 29. 
Dezember 1994, nicht eindeutig erkennbar gemacht haben, daß die Klägerin endgültig von der 
Vertragsdurchführung Abstand nehmen wollte. Auch eine durch die Nichteinhaltung der Nachfrist 
aufschiebend bedingte Aufhebungserklärung, wie sie grundsätzlich zulässig ist (vgl. BGHZ 74, 193, 204 und 
Schlechtriem-Huber a.a.O. Art. 49 CISG Rdn. 31) wird man in den genannten Schreiben der Klägerin 
ebensowenig wie in ihrem Fax vom 3. November 1994 sehen können, weil dies voraussetzte, daß die 
Klägerin sich mit diesen Schreiben tatsächlich ihres Wahlrechts zwischen Vertragserfüllung und 
Sekundäransprüchen begeben wollte. Hiergegen spricht die vorgelegte Korrespondenz, weil die Klägerin 
weiterhin an ihrem Anspruch auf Vertragserfüllung ("performance of the contract") festhielt.’  
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that a declaration of avoidance is not required where the seller finally and definitively refuses 
to deliver: 
‘[A]n express declaration of avoidance by the plaintiff was, however, dispensable as 
the defendant repudiated the performance of the contract finally and definitively pre-
vious to the substitute transaction. Although the CISG does not provide an exception 
from the principle that a declaration of avoidance previous to the substitute transac-
tion is a prerequisite, however, it follows from the requirement to ‘observe good faith 
in international trade’ (Art. 7(1) CISG) that a declaration of avoidance is not required 
if an avoidance of the contract is possible and it is certain, at the time of the substi-
tute transaction, that the debtor will under no circumstances perform.'382 
This case shows the far-reaching effects that a mere interpretation of the Convention, strictly 
within the wording of Art. 7(1) CISG, can have on the rights and duties of a contract party. 
The interpretation of Art. 75 CISG with regard to the observance of good faith has an imme-
diate effect on the rights and duties of the parties, as only good faith leads to the result that 
one party can claim remedies that are not granted by the wording of the rule. It is, however, 
questionable whether the reference of good faith was indispensable to the achievement of 
this result. There is a parallel to German law383 where the provision requiring a Nachfrist 
(grace period) in cases of late delivery, § 326 BGB, did not provide for exceptions.384 The 
German courts held that insisting on the requirement of a Nachfrist in conjunction with the 
threat to repudiate the contract would be contrary to Treu und Glauben under § 242 BGB, as 
the purpose of the Nachfrist, to warn the seller and give him a last chance to perform, could 
no longer be achieved.385 Although the result has not been challenged, the resort to good 
faith was said to be unnecessary as a mere interpretation with regard to the purpose of the 
norm would have led to the same result. The same can be said with regard to Art. 75 CISG, 
as the declaration of avoidance serves only to inform the other party about the conse-
quences of non-performance in order to give it a chance to maintain the contractual relation-
ship (consequence of the favor contractus principle). Once the seller no longer intends to 
                                                
382 Own translation of Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, 28 February 1997, 1 U 167/95 (CISG-Online, German text 
only): 'Eine ausdrückliche Aufhebungserklärung der Klägerin war aber deswegen entbehrlich, weil die 
Beklagte vor Durchführung des Deckungsgeschäftes die Erfüllung des Kaufvertrages endgültig und ernsthaft 
verweigert hatte. Eine Ausnahme vom Grundsatz der Erforderlichkeit der Aufhebungserklärung vor Vornahme 
des Deckungsgeschäftes ist im CISG zwar nicht vorgesehen, aus dem Gebot der "Wahrung des guten 
Glaubens im internationalen Handel" (Art. 7 Abs. 1 CISG) folgt aber, daß eine Vertragsaufhebungserklärung 
entbehrlich ist, wenn die Vertragsaufhebung grundsätzlich möglich ist und bei Vornahme des 
Deckungsgeschäftes feststeht, daß der Schuldner keinesfalls erfüllen wird (vgl. Schlechtriem-Stoll a.a.O. Art. 
75 CISG Rdn. 5, Staudinger-Magnus a.a.O. Art. 75 CISG Rdn. 8 und Stoll, RabelsZ 52 Jhrg. [1988], 617, 
635).'' 
383 Previous to the reform of the law of obligations with effect from 1 January 2002. 
384 As the equivalent norm, the first sentence of Art. 47(2) CISG, does. The reformed German law of obligations 
adopted the solution provided by the CISG in § 323(2), no.1 BGB. 
385 Cf. as only one example amongst many Bundesgerichtshof, NJW-RR 1997, 622, sec. 1, c: '[M]uß sich der 
Schuldner bereits aufgrund der Vertragserklärungen darüber klar sein, daß er die Folgen auf sich nehmen 
muß, wenn er die Zeit nicht einhält, innerhalb der die Erfüllung vereinbart worden ist, ist eine Mahnung durch 
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perform, the purpose of the declaration can no longer be fulfilled. The interpretation accord-
ing to the object and purpose of the rule (teleological interpretation) is considered to be ap-
plicable to the Convention.386 Consequently, the same objections to the use of good faith that 
have been raised in German law also apply to the CISG. 
 
The exception to the requirement of a declaration of avoidance shows close relations to the 
prohibition of inconsistent behaviour as the buyer relied on the definitive and final repudiation 
of the contract by the seller. Furthermore, the principle contained in Art. 80 CISG, that a party 
shall not gain advantages from its own non-performance, could also be relied on in order to 
justify the result. 
 
2. No Protection for the Fraudulent Party 
The Appellate Court of Cologne decided the following case:387 the parties concluded a con-
tract about the sale of a used car. The buyer claimed non-conformity, as the car was neither 
of the specified licensing year, nor did it show the indicated mileage. The seller asserted that 
the buyer could not have been unaware of the non-conformity, a defence that was accepted 
by the lower court and led, consequently to the rejection of the claim of the buyer according 
to Art. 35(3) CISG. The Appellate Court, however, found that the seller acted fraudulently 
whereas the buyer acted merely with gross negligence. Subsequently, the Appellate Court 
held, with reference to the principle of good faith, that a party which acts merely with negli-
gence deserves more protection by the law than a fraudulent party: 
'[I]t has to be inferred from the basic idea of Art. 40 CISG, whereby a seller is not 
entitled to rely on the conduct of the buyer if the seller is to blame more, in connec-
tion with Art. 7(1) CISG, that in case of a fraudulent conduct of the [seller], the 
[seller] has to accept responsibility even if the [buyer] could not be unaware of the 
non-conformity. Therefore, the statements of the [seller] pertaining to the supposed 
possibilities of perception of the [buyer]'s wife - which, as has to be pointed out sup-
plementary, cannot be equated with the possibilities of perception of the [buyer] 
himself - are not relevant. Even a grossly negligent unknowing buyer appears to be 
more protection-worthy than a seller acting fraudulently [...]. Consequently, when 
there is fraudulent conduct of the seller, the inapplicability of Art. 35(3) CISG follows 
from Art. 40 in connection with Art. 7(1) CISG.'388 
                                                
den Gläubiger nach Treu und Glauben entbehrlich, weil sie reine Förmelei wäre.' 
386 See Chapter 2, section B, VI, 1 above. 
387 Oberlandesgericht Köln (Germany), 21 May 1995, 22 U 4/96 (CISG-Online, English translation on the Pace 
Law School website): 
388 Oberlandesgericht Köln (Germany), 21 May 1995, 22 U 4/96 (CISG-Online, English translation on the Pace 
Law School website): [Bei Arglist des Verkäufers ist aus dem Grundgedanken des Artikel 40 CISG, wonach 
der Verkäufer sich nicht auf ein Verhalten des Käufers berufen kann, wenn ihn selber ein größerer Vorwurf 
trifft, in Verbindung mit Artikel 7 Abs. 1 CISG zu folgern, daß der Verkäufer selbst dann einzustehen hat, wenn 
 
69 
This decision complies with the prevailing view in scholarly writing.389 It appears that the 
problem cannot be solved by deducing a general principle from Art. 40 CISG, which states 
that a seller who is aware of the non-conformity does not require protection, as a similar 
general principle can be deduced from Art. 35(3) CISG with regard to the knowledge of the 
buyer. Neither of the provisions contain a statement regarding which party must be protected 
more in a where both parties had or could have had knowledge. It follows from a general 
principle of justice, fairness or equity, that the party that acted intentionally and in bad faith 
deserves less protection by the law than a party that only acted negligently. This notion of 
justice can, however, not be deduced from a specific provision of the CISG, but only be ap-
plied by reference to good faith. 
 
3. The tu quoque or 'Unclean Hands' Defence 
Whereas the previously discussed decision of the Appellate Court of Cologne had to decide 
the question of two parties who were both wrong but to a different degree, the question which 
remains to be answered is how to decide if both parties committed a similar severe breach of 
contract. 
 
Under German law, it is acknowledged that there exists no general duty that a party must act 
in conformity of the contract in order to be able to exercise its contractual rights. Hence, even 
the extensive application of good faith in German law does not lead to a positive duty to act 
in good faith.390 However, if a party has violated its own obligation under the contract se-
verely, it is not allowed to claim remedies for a breach of contract by the other party. This 
exception based on good faith is known from Roman law as tu quoque defence, and is re-
lated to the English law doctrine of 'unclean hands'.391 
 
                                                
der Käufer über den Mangel nicht in Unkenntnis sein konnte. Deshalb kommt es auf die Ausführungen der 
Beklagten zu den angeblichen Erkenntnismöglichkeiten der Ehefrau des Klägers die, worauf ergänzend 
hinzuweisen sei, nicht gleichzusetzen sind mit der Erkenntnismöglichkeit des Klägers selbst, nicht an. Selbst 
der grob fahrlässig unwissende Käufer erscheint schutzwürdiger als der arglistig handelnde Verkäufer. [...] Bei 
arglistigen Verhalten des Verkäufers folgt somit aus Artikel 40 i.V.m. Artikel 7 Abs. 1 CISG die 
Unanwendbarkeit des Artikel 35 Abs. 3 CISG.] 
389 Schlechtriem/Schwenzer, Commentary, Art. 35, sec. 37: ‘In the case of a fraudulent concealment of a defect, 
it can be inferred from the principle underlying Article 40 (seller unable to rely upon the buyer’s conduct if he is 
acting in bad faith), in conjunction with Article 7(1), that the seller is liable even where the buyer could not 
have been unaware of the defect. A buyer who is unaware of a defect merely on account of his gross negli-
gence seems to be more worthy of protection than a seller who deliberately sets out to deceive the buyer.’ 
390 Larenz/Wolf, § 16, sec. 35. 
391 Larenz/Wolf, § 16, sec. 35. 
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In German arbitral proceedings the tribunal had to decide a claim for damages.392 The parties 
had, inter alia, concluded a basic agreement about the delivery of goods on short notice. 
After a certain time the seller had problems to deliver and could not fulfil its obligations under 
the agreement. Consequently; the buyer terminated the basic agreement. However, the tri-
bunal found that the buyer had not paid outstanding debts from previous deliveries, and that 
this amounted to a fundamental breach of contract that would have given the seller the right 
to terminate the contract. The tribunal held that 
'[I]t is true that in German private law, in the case of the termination of a long-term 
relationship on serious grounds, according to the legal principles of Sects. 326, 626 
and 628 Civil Code, the damage caused by the termination (failure to perform) can 
in principle be asserted. However, this does not apply where a party failed to fulfil 
the contract and thereby gave the other contracting party serious grounds to termi-
nate the relationship. It would be contrary to good faith if the non-terminating party 
were put in a worse position because he was ready to continue under the contract 
notwithstanding the contractual violation by the terminating party. The general prin-
ciple of good faith also applies to international contracts for the delivery of goods by 
instalments.'393 
The decisive idea underlying this ruling is that the award of damages 'cannot depend on a 
race of mutual declarations of termination'.394 Otherwise the outcome of the legal proceed-
ings would be determined by the random fact that the party who declares avoidance of the 
contract first, wins the case. The arbitrariness of this result that can hardly be seen in com-
pliance with justice, fairness or equity. However, there seems to be no specific provisions in 
the CISG which could serve as an analogy to justify the result.395 
 
It is conceded that the tribunal relied on German civil law in its reasoning, as it was of the 
opinion that the CISG did not provide specific rules and, thus, 'supplemented' the interpreta-
                                                
392 Schiedsgericht der Handelskammer Hamburg, 21 March 1996, (Pace Law School website): 
393 Schiedsgericht der Handelskammer Hamburg, 21 March 1996 (UNILEX, English translation on Pace Law 
School website): [Im übrigen ist das Schiedsgericht der Auffassung, daß die obige Schadenszurechnung nach 
Art. 74 CISG nicht anders beurteilt werden kann als im nationalen Recht, das mangels näherer 
supranationaler Erkenntnisse im Rahmen des Art. 7 CISG ergänzend herangezogen werden kann. Nach 
deutschem bürgerlichen Recht kann zwar grundsätzlich bei der Kündigung eines Dauerschuldverhältnisses 
aus wichtigem Grund (nach den Rechtsgedanken der §§ 326, 626, 628 BGB) der durch die Kündigung 
(Nichterfüllung) entstandene Schaden geltend gemacht werden. Ohne daß es auf die Voraussetzungen 
dieses Anspruchs noch ankommt, entfällt dieser aber, wenn mangels eigener Vertragstreue erst recht - die 
andere Vertragspartei zur Kündigung aus wichtigem Grund berechtigt war [...]. Es würde nämlich gegen Treu 
und Glauben verstoßen, wenn man den Empfänger der Kündigung deshalb schlechter stellen wollte, weil er 
seinerseits bereit war, trotz des vertragswidrigen Verhaltens des Kündigenden am Vertrag festzuhalten [...]. 
Auf einen Wettlauf bei der wechselseitigen Erklärung kann es nicht ankommen. Das Prinzip von Treu und 
Glauben gilt als allgemeines Prinzip auch bei internationalen Sukzessivlieferungsverträgen.] 
394 Schiedsgericht der Handelskammer Hamburg, 21 March 1996 (UNILEX). This second last sentence of the 
cited paragraph was omitted in the English translation of the award provided by the Pace Law School website. 
For the German original, see the second last sentence in quote in the previous footnote. 
395 Art. 80 CISG, dealing with a situation where both parties are at fault, does not fit as it requires that the one 
party's failure to perform was caused by the other party. The rule in the present case, however, applies also 
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tion of Art. 74 CISG via the second alternative of Art. 7(2) CISG with, domestic, German 
law.396 It has been stated above, that this method is incorrect because in matters that are 
governed by the Convention, the solution has be found primarily within the Convention. 
However, it is hard to see how an application of good faith under CISG, be it within Art. 7(1) 
or (2) CISG, could have led to a different conclusion. 
 
III. Good Faith as a Basis for Damages? The 'Notorious Grenoble Case' 
The cases above have in common that good faith was used as 'a shield', i.e. a defence, in 
order to either restrict the rights of a party or to correct rules that otherwise would lead to 
unjust results. The question remains whether the function of good faith can be taken one 
step further and be used as 'a sword' in order to create new rights. In a, much discussed, 
decision a French court seemed to have based a claim for damages on the principle of good 
faith.397 
 
The case involved a contract between a French seller and an American buyer for jeans. It 
was specified that the jeans were to be sent to South America and Africa. During the negotia-
tions and performance of the contract, the seller repeatedly insisted on knowing the destina-
tion of the goods as he had an interest in preventing parallel imports into Spain. It transpired, 
however, that the second delivery of jeans had been sent to Spain. The seller's subsequent 
termination of the contract led the buyer to commence court proceedings in order to claim for 
damages. The buyer's failure to respect the wishes of the seller was found to be a fundamen-
tal breach of the contract because he must have known from the contractual negotiations 
how important it was to the seller that the goods not be sent to Spain. Although it is not 
clearly stated, it must be assumed that the court, in interpreting the contract with respect to 
all circumstances according to Art. 8 CISG, found that the territorial exclusivity clause was a 
contract term which was implied by the parties.398 Hence, the court rejected the claim of the 
buyer. Moreover, the court accepted the counterclaim of the seller for damages caused by 
the legal action of the buyer: 
                                                
where the two breaches of the contract are not related to each other. 
396 Schiedsgericht der Handelskammer Hamburg, 21 March 1996, (Pace Law School website): '[F]or the rest, the 
apportionment of damages according to Art. 74 CISG is not to be judged differently from national law, which 
law can be applied subsidiarily, under Art. 7 CISG, in the absence of more detailed supranational provisions.' 
397 Cour d’Appel de Grenoble (France), 22 February 1995, 93/3275, SARL Bri Production 'Bonaventure' v Société 
Pan African Export (Bilingual text in English and French in Pace Law School website). 
398 It comes a bit as a surprise that the territorial exclusivity was not an express term of the contract if was so 
important to the seller. Though not stated in the decision, the reason was probably the fear that such a clause 
could be seen as a violation of antitrust legislation, in particular the European Community (EC) competition 
rules. The buyer, in fact, raised the objection that the implied term of a territorial exclusivity was void as it vio-
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'Whereas, regarding the sum of 10,000 francs claimed by [the seller] for abusive and 
unjustified actions, the conduct of [the buyer], going against the principle of good 
faith in international trade promulgated by article 7 of the Vienna Convention, made 
worse by the judicial position taken by the plaintiff at trial constitutes an abuse of 
procedure; whereas the inconvenience caused by this trial to [the seller] justifies the 
sum requested'399 
This ruling must be considered unfortunate as the abuse of proceedings is a matter that is 
not covered by the Convention. Good faith under Art. 7 CISG can, however, only reach as far 
as the Convention is applicable. Hence, the resort to domestic civil procedural law would be 
preferable.400 A way to award damages under the CISG would be to regard the commence-
ment of the legal proceedings as a consequence of the buyer's breach of contract, and the 
costs for the proceedings as a causal damage to be recovered according to Art. 74 CISG.401 
It is suggested that the court might have used the principle of good faith in order to describe 
a breach of contract, and that the court wanted to award damages under Art. 74 CISG. If this 
was the case, the decision was less far-reaching as the unfortunate wording suggests. 
 
E. Conclusion 
It can be concluded that decisions where the principle of good faith is the pivotal argument to 
justify the result of the case, are rarely encountered. The fear that a large body of case law 
with regard to good faith would emerge has not materialised.  
 
The main area of application for a general principle of good faith in practice is the corrective 
function of good faith.402 Doctrines that were developed as far back as in Roman law, such 
as venire contra factum proprium and tu quoque, seem to be so deeply rooted in the idea of 
justice, equity or fairness that they not only reappeared under the CISG, but will certainly 
become well established, be it with reference to good faith under Art. 7(1) CISG, or as an 
independent general principle of the Convention under Art. 7(2) CISG. This might be seen as 
a homeward trend. However, one should be aware that the CISG did not come into existence 
                                                
lated EC rules. The court, however, rejected the objection due to a lack of evidence. 
399 Cour d’Appel de Grenoble (France), 22 February 1995, 93/3275, SARL Bri Production 'Bonaventure' v Société 
Pan African Export (Bilingual text in English and French in Pace Law School website). 
400 Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws, p. 11; Sim, sec. IV, A, 5. 
401 For a contrary view cf. Sim, sec. IV, A, 5, who sees the decision as an award of punitive damages, which are, 
according to the prevailing view, not admissible under the CISG. The facts of the case are, however, not clear. 
The claimed sum might as well have been what defendant and court saw as 'reasonable' or 'foreseeable' legal 
costs.  
402 This refers to decisions which contributes to the development of good faith only. If one considers all cases 
referring good faith, the predominant function appears to be the 'redundant function', see the five categories in 
section A above. 
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in a vacuum. The problems that emerge in international trade are to a great extent 'classics' 
under domestic law and it is not surprising that similar problems cause similar solutions. 
 
Furthermore, it can be concluded that the application of good faith within the wording of 
Art. 7(1) CISG, i.e. the restriction to an interpretation of the Convention only, can lead to a 
far-reaching interference with the parties rights and duties under the contract.403 That those 
decisions which enter new territory as far as good faith under the CISG is concerned, come 
from the German speaking countries is not surprising, as these countries do not only use 
good faith extensively in domestic law, but are also said to make the biggest contribution to 
the overall caseload of the CISG.404 It should be noted, that none of the leading cases cited 
under section D above has yet been confirmed by subsequent decisions, and it will be inter-
esting to see how adjudicators from common law jurisdictions react to these decisions. 
 
It is disappointing, however, that none of the cases cited in this chapter refers to other deci-
sions. Moreover, it is striking that almost none of the decisions refer to the fact that the scope 
and application of good faith under the CISG is highly contentious. Consistent case law with 
regard to a general principle of good faith as well as to specific good faith doctrines under 
Art. 7(2) CISG can only emerge if there is an interaction between the different courts and 
tribunals, identifying wrong or excessive decisions, and agreeing on a safe middle ground 
that can be used as basis for new developments. It can only be hoped that the future will 
bring some developments and that adjudicators, as well as counsel, will make more use of 
the easy ways to access cases and scholarly writing from other jurisdictions via the internet. 
                                                
403 If one wants to understand 'interpretation' in the narrowest possible sense as explaining the meaning of an 
ambiguous term, then the cases cited under section D are, of course, far beyond the wording of Art. 7(1), cf. 
Sim, sec. III, B, 2, d. It is, however, not a new insight that the interpretation of the law is always a development 
of old law and, thus, the creation of new rules of law, cf. as only a few amongst many Larenz/Wolf, § 4, 
sec. 72; Eörsi, § 2.05, sec. 2-16. 
404 At least as far as the published decisions are concerned, Germany is said to render the most decisions, cf. 
e.g. Will, p. 256 ff. 
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Summary 
It has been shown that good faith in civil law jurisdictions fulfils three functions: to interpret 
unclear terms; to supplement contracts; and to correct the written rules by restricting rights or 
derogating from strict law. In jurisdictions where good faith is not used, other doctrines fulfil 
these tasks.  
 
Good faith is used as a methodological instrument in order to exercise the three functions 
within a code. Hence, a coherent and substantive doctrine of good faith does not exist. The 
scope of application of good faith depends on the extent to which the three functions have to 
be applied (functional approach). Hence, good faith is subsidiary to other, more specific 
means that fulfil the functions of good faith. 
 
Good faith in the CISG is unlikely to develop to an excessive extent. The scope of Art. 7(1) 
CISG does not permit the imposition of obligations on the parties. The functions of good faith 
in the CISG can to a great extent be fulfilled by other devices. Particularly, the general princi-
ples under Art. 7(2) CISG, and the presence of objective-normative standards in specific pro-
visions let a resort to good faith appear superfluous. Areas of application of good faith can 
emerge where: the text of the CISG is ambiguous; two principles of the CISG lead to contra-
dictory results; and solutions outside the CISG have to be imported into the CISG as a last 
resort. 
 
The published case law confirms the limited need for a general principle of good faith in the 
CISG. In most decisions the reference to good faith is redundant. The main area of applica-
tion is the restrictive role of good faith, although it is not always clear whether or not the re-
spective decision relies on good faith, or on an specific general principle under Art. 7(2) 
CISG, or on a teleological interpretation of a specific CISG provision. 
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